Another Familiar Problem: Religious Intolerance
John Locke presents a classic argument for the toleration of diverse religious beliefs in
“A Letter Concerning Toleration.” It is summarized in the following passage:
The care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power consists only in
outward force: but true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind,
without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the
understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by outward force.
Confiscation of estate, imprisonment, torments, nothing of that nature can have any such
efficacy as to make men change the inward judgment that they have framed of things.
(1689/1824, 11)
Suppose the state, personified in the quotation as the civil magistrate, has as a goal
bringing all its citizens into the true and saving religion. To do so, it must ensure that they
are all inwardly persuaded of the correct religious doctrines. Given diversity of doctrinal
beliefs among the citizens, what is the state to do? The only means at its disposal is the
application or threat of outward force against those citizens who are inwardly persuaded
of incorrect doctrines. But even if the state is willing to persecute such citizens, such a
policy of coercive action cannot succeed in reaching the state's goal, because outward
force cannot compel change in belief. So, as it is bound to fail, persecution in order to
bring citizens into the true and saving religion is instrumentally irrational.
Locke holds that outward force cannot compel change of belief because he thinks that
belief is not subject to voluntary control. He insists that “speculative opinions, therefore,
and articles of faith, as they are called, cannot be imposed on any church by the law of
the land; for it is absurd that things should be enjoined by laws, which are not in men's
power to perform; and to believe this or that to be true, does not depend upon our will”
(1689/1824, 39–40). The law might enjoin me to recite the words of a certain creed every
day; the words I utter are under my voluntary control, and so this daily recitation is
within my power to perform. What would be absurd, according to Locke, is a law
enjoining belief in the creed thus recited. The state can coerce lip service; it cannot coerce
genuine faith.
Two powerful objections to this Lockean argument have been raised by Jeremy Waldron
(1988). The first attacks its assumption that belief is not subject to voluntary control.
Waldron grants that belief is not normally subject to direct voluntary control. If, looking
directly at it, I now believe there is a green tree before me, there is no act of will I can
perform that will make me believe there is a red fire engine before me. Waldron points
out, however, that belief is often
end p.401
subject to indirect voluntary control because we can control, within limits, the sources of
belief we attend to or take notice of. Suppose it is highly likely that we will believe the
doctrines of the true and saving religion if we read its sacred books and attend its holy