that he does not show us the city with no main road. For Wittgenstein, there is a
fundamental vocational difference between a philosopher who is not a citizen of any
community of ideas, and a philosopher whose use of philosophy subserves such a
community.^16 The difference is shown in the kind of sensibility we find in Wittgenstein's
work, particularly in doing justice to perspectives that are not his own.^17 Such a
sensibility is precisely what is needed if philosophy, in the academy, is to get beyond
apologetics, either for or against, religion.
In this chapter, I have tried to do two things. First, I have tried to relate
Wittgensteinianism in the philosophy of religion to some central issues in the history of
philosophy that Wittgenstein discussed. Second, I have tried to relate those connections
to a wide range of other movements in contemporary philosophy of religion.
Given contemporary philosophical practice, I have also been mindful of the fact that I am
probably writing for nonreaders of Wittgenstein. In that context, my main concern is with
anti-Wittgensteinians who are nonreaders of his work, but whose views of it have been
shaped by accusations of nonrealism, relativism, expressivism and fideism,^18 and so on.
My closing remarks, adapted from Schleiermacher, are for them: “Let us deal honestly
with one another. You do not like [Wittgenstein], we started from that assumption. But in
conducting an honest battle against [him] which is not completely without effort, you do
not want to have fought against a shadow like the one with which we have struggled”
(1996, 21).
NOTES
1.Wolterstorff claims that as a result of Moore's and Russell's interventions against
idealism, metaphysical realism reasserted itself. But they intervened in the name of
realism. Wolterstorff uses the terms interchangeably. For my critique of his reading of
twentieth-century philosophy, see Phillips (2001a).
2.As a reaction, we have the amusing, and not so amusing, advice against doing
philosophy of religion in one's doctoral dissertation, even if it is one's main interest.
3.For a fuller discussion, see Phillips (2000a).
4.For this tradition, see Swinburne (1977, 1979, 1981).
5.For these and other criticisms of Reid, see Winch (1953) and his Oxford B. Phil thesis
on Reid (Winch 1951). I made great use of these criticisms in Phillips (2001a). See also
Phillips (2004a).
6.For this dispute in relation to Hume, see Gaskin (1988); Butler (1960); Penelhum
(1983); Ferreira (1999); Harvey (1999); and Phillips (1999b).
7.For my critique, see Phillips (2000b).
8.For my critique, see Phillips (1998).
9.In what follows I am indebted to Rhees (unpublished ms.). I was equally indebted to
Rhees's insights in Phillips (1999a), where there is a parallel discussion.
10.Our primitive reactions, in this case our color reactions, are not the foundations
end p.466