of language. Wittgenstein is not advancing anything like a genetic theory of meaning. For
a discussion of this issue, see Malcolm (1982) and Rhees (1997g) incorporated into
Rhees (1998) in a wider setting.
11.Aquinas says in Summa Contra Gentiles: “Unde relinquitur quod nullo modo est in
genere substantiae.”
12.In my discussion of On Certainty I am indebted to Rhees (2002).
13.I am grateful to Richard Amesbury for pointing this out.
14.See my chapter on Feuerbach (Phillips, 2001b).
15.A proper discussion of the problem of evil needs a book to itself. See Phillips (2004b).
For my earlier criticism of contemporary theodicies, see Phillips (1981, 1977), the later
essays in Phillips (1991, 1986b), and Phillips (2002a, 2002b). See also Rhees (1997f).
But for the profoundest discussion, see Weil (1959).
16.For my discussion of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein in this context, see Phillips
(1999a).
17.For a discussion of this sensibility, see Winch's response in Malcolm (1994).
18.I have relegated the unscholarly term “Wittgensteinian fideism” to a footnote in this
context. It is ironic that Wittgenstein, who was not a believer, has had his name used for a
view which holds that only religious believers understand religious belief! The original
charge of fideism was made in Nielsen (1967). I provided detailed textual refutations in
Phillips (1986a). The term disappeared for a while thereafter, but is now back in
circulation. I have therefore repeated part of my critique in Phillips (2001b). Some
philosophers think that the only consequence of the critique is to arrive at a different
definition of “Wittgensteinian fideism,” whereas the real task is to overcome an obstacle
of the will, not an obstacle of the intellect, and admit that the use of the term was
confused from the outset. Will this happen? Of course not.
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end p.467