426 Part IV: Thinking the Unconditional
for the social sciences is that they must represent this contradictorinessat
the level of theory. In the same way that the facts do not obey logicalpre-
cepts, so too knowledge of society cannot claim to be free of contradic-
tion, in other words, consistent with formal logic. Where sociology goes
beyond the observation and description of facts, it becomescriticism,
which, according to Adorno and in conflict with Popper, necessarily
contains a speculative element. Furthermore, ‘the critical path is not
merely formal but also material’.^69 The critical element of sociology
results from the experience that society is antagonistic, conflict-ridden.
Adorno described this experience of social contradictions as the histor-
ical starting-point of sociological thought, as the ‘motive which first
constitutes the possibility of sociology as such’.^70
The discussion of Popper’s and Adorno’s presentations during the
Tübingen workshop was less heated than had been expected. One rea-
son was that the two opponents confined themselves to introducing
their basic positions, without attempting to differentiate between them.
A sharper tone made its appearance in the second round of the discus-
sions where the two sides were represented by Jürgen Habermas and
Hans Albert. Habermas published his criticism of critical rationalism in
the Festschrift Zeugnisse that was produced by the institute for Adorno’s
sixtieth birthday. Adorno evidently regarded this essay, ‘Analytical
Theory of Science and Dialectics’, as confirmation of his own position.
For when, later on, he was asked by Frank Benseler, the editor of
Luchterhand Verlag, to write an introduction to the volume containing
all the significant talks and essays on the positivist dispute, he produced
a scathing criticism of everything that he understood by positivism.^71 As
an explanation for this renewed attempt to define his own position, he
argued that ‘the amiable tolerance towards two different coexisting types
of sociology would amount to the neutralization of the emphatic claim
to truth.’^72 He now brought the truth claims of his own approach to
sociology to bear in an attack on critical rationalism.^73
On the whole, Adorno simply identified critical rationalism with
logical positivism, which in turn he regarded as forming part of the
‘nominalist, sceptical tradition’.^74 The thrust of his attack emerged clearly
in his comments on Popper’s postulate of scientific objectivity, which
Popper thought was guaranteed by competition among scientists,
mutual criticism and free discussion.^75 Adorno, who on this occasion
saw no reason to pull his punches, objected that the questionable nature
of these categories was very striking. ‘For instance, the category of
competition contains the entire mechanism of competition. ..Success
in the market place has primacy over the qualities of the object, even
of intellectual formations. The tradition upon which Popper relies has
apparently developed within the universities into a fetter on productive
forces. In Germany, a critical tradition is completely lacking.’^76
Adorno began to write his introduction to the collection of essays
that made up the dispute on positivism under great external pressure in