A Theory Devoured by Thought 427mid-1968. The subject matter was loosely related to that of a lecture
course he was giving during that summer semester.^77 His introduction
contained a number of references to the ‘Frankfurt School’. Thissuggests
that he may well have thought of his renewed criticism of positivism
together with his lectures on the Introduction to Sociology as a step
towards a definitive attempt to establish the epistemologicalfoundations
of his own approach to sociology. This venture was based on a con-
tradictio in adjecto that he was concerned to resolve. The contradiction
consisted of the attempt to demonstrate its paradigmatic status as a
critical theory of society so that its characteristic way of thinking would
emerge clearly without its acquiring the dogmatic character of a doc-
trine. This explains why he defined sociology as a mode of reflection. It
was said to burst the bounds of the individual disciplines; it was ‘a piece
of intellectual compensation for the division of labour, and should not,
in turn, be unconditionally fixed in accordance with the division of
labour. But it is no more true to claim that sociology simply brings the
contents of these areas of study into. ..contact. What is called inter-
disciplinary cooperation cannot be equated with sociology. It is the taskof
the latter to reveal the mediations of the object categories.. ..Sociology
is orientated towards the immanent interplay of the elements dealt with
in a relatively independent manner by economics, history, psychology
and anthropology. It attempts to restore scientifically the unity which
they form.’^78 His objection to positivism, as he saw it, was its failure to
acknowledge the collapse of subjective reason, its hypostatization of the
knowing subject and its forms of thought, and its conversion of science
into a technology. It was this that explained its orientation towards
the primacy of functioning techniques and the emphasis on deductive,
defining theorems, as well as the primacy of formal logic. Itsinstrument-
alization of science was so comprehensive that the knowing subject
was itself caught up in it and thus converted itself into an object, a
development that ultimately led to the loss of spontaneity. This reification
of consciousness took place at the expense of the immediate ability to
experience. For his part, Adorno thought it essential for the knowledge
of society to remain open to pre-scientific experience so that knowledge
could keep in touch with life as it is lived. This relation between know-
ledge and life, however, must be critical, and it must be based on the
‘legitimation of the reality recognized’^79 rather than confining itself to
ensuring that propositions are free of contradictions.
‘To perceive something in the features of totality’s social givenness’,^80
in other words, to track down the structure of society in the individual
phenomenon, was something that in Adorno’s view could only be
achieved by unregimented experience. Such experience was for him
the first condition of the theoretical knowledge of society to which he
aspired. ‘Only an experience that succeeds in perceiving changes in
the physiognomy of society without reaching prematurely for ready-
made theories. ..is capable of serving as a starting-point for a relevant