52 International The Economist February 12th 2022
such as Turkey, were acting unilaterally in
Europe’s “neighbourhood” without con
sulting their allies.
Since then, however, nato has revived
admirably. Under President Joe Biden
America sounded the alarm about Russia’s
buildup and coordinated the Western re
sponse. “Putin has singlehandedly given
nato a vitamin injection,” says Wolfgang
Ischinger, chairman of the Munich Securi
ty Conference, an annual transatlantic
talkfest that begins on February 18th. na-
to’s three decades of angst about its role
after the end of the cold war has been dis
pelled. Having performed “out of area” op
erations in the Balkans and counterinsur
gency in Afghanistan, it is going back to ba
sics: the territorial defence of allies. The
theological rivalry between institutions in
Brusselsover whether the eu should have
an autonomous defence capability has for
the moment been stilled.
In this crisis the eu has been sidelined,
perhaps inevitably. Ever since France
blocked the idea of a European Defence
Community with a panEuropean army in
1954, European integration has been pur
sued mainly by economic means. Yet
France now pushes hard for the eu to build
it own military capacity. The brain comes alive again
Atlanticists have long worried that the eu
would at best duplicate already scarce mil
itary capabilities and at worst split Ameri
ca from the eu. The ensuing compromises
have created an alphabet soup of European
structures and initiatives but little extra
military muscle. For instance, since 2007
the eu has had two battlegroups of about
1,500 soldiers each, supposedly ready to
deploy at short notice. It has never used
them, although it has mounted other ad
hoc missions. In fending off Russia it is na-
to members, individually and collectively,
including France, that have taken up the
cudgels to send troops to reinforce their
eastern European allies.
“The European Union cannot defend
Europe,” says Jens Stoltenberg, nato’s sec
retarygeneral, noting that “80% of nato’s
defence expenditure comes from noneu
members”. nato’s military heft derives
mainly from American muscle. But it is
more than that, Mr Stoltenberg says. Brit
ain, Iceland and Norway, which are not in
the eu, are vital to securing Europe’s north
ern flank, along with Canada. Similarly, de
spite tensions with its nato allies, Turkey
supports Ukraine and anchors the alliance
in the southeast. In return, nato helps
give America an unrivalled network of
friends and allies. Europe and North Amer
ica, Mr Stoltenberg says, must stand in
“strategic solidarity”.
But for all of nato’s primacy, it cannot
solve the problem of Russia. To begin with,
the alliance does not include Finland andSweden. Though they are not covered by
nato’s Article 5, which states that an attack
on one ally is an attack on all, they are
nominally protected by the mutualde
fence provision in article 42 (7) of the eu
treaty. Moreover, it is the eu that coordi
nates and imposes economic sanctions.
The euis also vital in building a more resil
ient energy system, including an internal
market that lets countries trade electricity
and natural gas. In Ukraine the euhas pro
vided billions of euros in aid to help reform
the corruptionriddled economy.
Within both nato and the eu there have
been fewer disagreements than expected.
No one questions the principle of “mas
sive” sanctions against Russia if it invades
Ukraine. After some reluctance, Mr Scholz
accepts that Nord Stream 2, a gas pipeline
from Russia to Germany, would be moth
balled. All understand the danger of a bel
ligerent Russia that seeks to redraw the in
ternational borders of Europe by force.
What if Russia embarks on a smaller ac
tion—something short of an invasion? And
how to react to nonmilitary “grey zone”
actions, such as a cyberattack and subver
sion? Mr Biden carelessly said that a “small
incursion” might elicit a lesser response.
But there has been little detailed discus
sion of such eventualities. Many allies fear
that would expose divisions; a fullscale
attack would probably not.
Mr Macron sees the Ukraine crisis as a
chance once again to promote the idea of
“European sovereignty”. Some people in
Paris speak of a “refounding moment”. In a
recent speech to the European Parliament
he hailed the eu’s growing sovereignty, de
fining it broadly, from the collective Euro
pean purchase of vaccines to the euro
zone’s monetary policy. But he also spoke
of building “a new order of security and
stability” in Europe—agreed on by Euro
peans, noneu nato allies and America—
and then proposed to Russia.
What he means is hazy. Some suggesthe is referring to such things as the need
for a new armscontrol regime in Europe
after Mr Trump’s withdrawal in 2019 from
the IntermediateRange Nuclear Force
Treaty and to the erosion of confidence
building measures, including advance no
tification of large military exercises. None
of this is eu business. These points have
anyway been included in America’s and
nato’s recent responses to Russia. What is
more, the French government does not
want to be drawn directly into nuclear
armscontrol talks with Russia, lest its
own force de frappe is called into question. America is back. For how long?
More than most of his predecessors, Mr
Macron understands the suspicion and re
sentment that all this can cause. He has be
come more willing to consult other eu
members than in the past. Jacques Chirac,
who resented the eu’s enlargement to east
ern and central Europe, once said that gov
ernments in that region would do better to
“shut up”. Mr Macron, in contrast, says the
“traumas” of countries that lived under So
viet rule should be understood.
Strikingly, the French are not alone in
talking about European sovereignty. The
idea pops up, for instance, in the coalition
agreement of Mr Scholz’s government. Es
tonians have joined the Frenchled Euro
pean Intervention Initiative, a forum for
strategic thinking and planning. So has
Britain. The idea that Europeans have to do
more for themselves is strengthened not
only by Russian brutishness, but also by
doubts about America’s commitment.
Mr Trump may return to power in 2025.
In any case, all recent American presidents
have wanted to edge away from Europe and
the Middle East to concentrate on the con
test with China in Asia. Indeed, some see
America’s new effort in Europe as a signal
not only to Russia but also to China, to de
ter it from attacking Taiwan.
“Do we have a Plan Bfor what the eu will
do if nato were to lose its main partner?”
asks Mr Ischinger. “I hope it will never hap
pen but it’s a matter of serious responsibil
ity to consider it.” Without the American
hegemon, though, it is still hard to envis
age the Europeans mustering a coherent
response. Foreign and securitypolicy de
cisions in the eu require unanimity. Differ
ent countries’ priorities diverge. Southern
ers want to focus on the Mediterranean
and migration; easterners put Russia first.
Moreover, political and strategic in
stincts differ, too. France favours wielding
military power but is wary of a nato
dominated by America; Germany embrac
es the alliance but for historical reasons is
shy of using force. And Britain has left the
eu entirely. “It is the European dilemma,”
says a Germandiplomat. “European sover
eignty is impossible.But it has never been
We won’t be snowed over more necessary.”n