126 Congressional politics
by no means determining factor in the way in which these patterns form.
The effect of party loyalty is at its greatest on procedural or organisational
votes: for example, the election of the Speaker, or the control over commit-
tee assignments. On substantive issues of policy, however, the alignments in
Congress depend upon the issue under consideration, and the importance of
party membership as an influence upon voting behaviour will depend upon
the nature of these issues. What then is the significance of party on the way
in which Senators and Representatives vote?
It is impossible to give an answer to this question in a straightforward way
that would suggest a simple causal relationship between party membership
and voting. It has been shown that there is a greater statistical correlation
between party and congressional voting patterns than between the latter and
any other single factor. Yet we have shown above that Senators and Congress-
men habitually vote against the majority of their party without any adverse
effects, either from the leadership of their party or from their constituents.
Why then should party allegiance affect voting at all? There are a number
of reasons. First of all, particularly for members of the House, there is an
important relationship between constituency attitudes and party image.
Representatives do not have the publicity exposure of Senators. They must
rely to a large extent upon the image that the electorate has of their party.
Often particular Congressmen can rise above this and make a personal im-
pression on the electorate, but they are bound to be concerned with the party
attitudes that many of their constituents have. This image will vary to some
extent from one part of the country to another, but the behaviour and poli-
cies of the president will be an important component of that image. When
there is no strong constituency opposition to the president’s policy, therefore,
the member of Congress will tend to go along with the party leader. If, how-
ever, constituency attitudes are clearly opposed to the president’s policy, then
the member of Congress will put constituency loyalty first and party loyalty
second. On very many issues that come to a vote in Congress the members’
constituents will be ignorant or apathetic, and in such circumstances legisla-
tors are free to listen to the urgings of pressure groups, or to vote the way
the administration or congressional leaders wish. The president has induce-
ments to offer – patronage or support for federal expenditures in their states
or districts – and congressional leaders can provide publicity, good commit-
tee assignments, help at election time, and special facilities on Capitol Hill.
Thus there will be a natural tendency for the members of the legislature to
go along with their party, unless there is some strong reason to the contrary.
Groups of Congressmen of the same party who come from similar con-
stituencies will naturally tend to react in the same way to the issues that
confront them. The most important result of this is the way in which intra-
party blocs form on overlapping sectional and ideological lines in Congress.
The relative freedom of members of Congress from party discipline means
also that coalitions can be formed across party lines by groups of Senators or
Representatives who take the same view on an issue in spite of the fact that