Congressional politics 127they are from different parties. These coalitions form and re-form according
to the issue, and they may be strong enough and stable enough over time to
flout the views of party leaders and to defeat the aims of the president and
his administration. The most famous of these is the so-called ‘conservative
coalition’ of Republicans and Southern Democrats, which for many years was
able to check the passage of legislation on civil rights. These legislative pro-
posals originated from Democratic presidents such as Kennedy and Johnson,
at a time when both Houses were under Democratic control, but the coalition
between many of the Republicans and the Southern Democrats who were op-
posed to the administration’s policies was powerful enough to defeat them.
On many issues, however, the administration will not even state a posi-
tion, or try to influence the vote. The administration cannot dictate to Con-
gress, and if it tried to use its persuasive powers all the time they would soon
become ineffectual. Thus it is rather misleading even to think in terms of
‘party discipline’ in Congress. When a president badly wants a measure to be
passed every weapon will be employed. An appeal may be made to constitu-
ents over the head of Congressmen. But the president will not, and could
not, conduct a continuous and consistent effort to direct congressional voting
behaviour on every issue. Equally, congressional leaders must attempt to per-
suade rather than wave a big stick. Thus the statistical correlation between
party and voting does not mean that senators and representatives are forced
to vote the party line. It usually means that it is their natural inclination to
do so. But when other factors enter into the picture then party loyalty may
soon be forgotten.
The most important factor that can disrupt party voting is the Congress-
man’s perception of the attitudes of constituents. Congressmen are highly
responsive to what they believe their constituents desire. They go to great
lengths to test opinion in their constituency, by taking public opinion polls
on issues, by extensive personal contacts and by paying close attention to
the huge deliveries of mail every Congressman receives. Undoubtedly, when
national party policy conflicts with constituency opinion, as they perceive it,
they will choose the latter. This is particularly clear in the field of civil rights,
where Congressmen are very sensitive to constituency opinion. On other is-
sues constituency opinion may be irrelevant because it is largely non-exist-
ent.
There is a third component, however, and that is the influence of pressure
groups. The power of pressure groups to influence congressional voting is
easy to explain in two types of case. First, when there is no particular con-
stituency interest involved, and when the administration takes up no position
on an issue, then a Congressman must look somewhere for the information
and the ‘cues’ that will determine his or her vote, and these the pressure
groups can provide. Second, when the appeals of a pressure group reinforce
constituency interest, the Senator or Congressman will be completely deaf to
appeals to party loyalty or to duty to the administration. The more difficult
case to explain is what happens when the constituency interest is neutral and