The Dictionary of Human Geography

suspicion of theory (although presumably
no contemporary economic geographer would
go as far as Chisholm ‘to wish ... th[e] love of
pure theory to the devil’; quoted in Wise,
1975, p. 2).
Chisholm’s and Smith’s emphasis was on
thecommodity, though neither appreciated
the conceptual richness of the concept, with
geography coming second. The American
geographer R.H. Whitbeck (1915–16,
p. 197) argued that it should be the other
way around: ‘the unit should be the country
and not the commodity’. The consequence
was an increasingly regional focus, at least
in economic geography in the USA, where
theregionwas defined as unique, and repre-
sented by using one typological scheme or
another. Clarence Fielden Jones’ (1935) text-
bookEconomic geography, for example, used
an eight-fold typology.
Hartshorne’s (1939)The nature of geography
later provided at least a splash of scholarly
respectability to anideographicregionalism.
But it did nothing to connect the discipline to
the fundamental changes that were about to
transform a number of social sciences, and
even some humanities, especially in the
USA, turning on the widespread use of scien-
tific methods andphilosophy(and propelled
by the Second World War and later thecold
war). Economic geography initially resisted
that impulse, but by the mid-1950s it too
joined in. The resultingquantitative revolu-
tionprofoundly altered the discipline, bringing
the systematic application of scientific forms of
theorizing and rigorous statistical techniques of
description and analysis (Barnes, 2001).
The discipline over the period 1955–75,
sometimes labelled spatial science, was
defined by:

(1) Formal theory and models, many
begged, borrowed and stolen fromneo-
classical economics(rational choice
theory, general and partial equilibrium,
location theory), and physics (spatial
interaction theoryand laterentropy-
maximizing models) (Pooler, 1977).
(2) quantitative methods, which were ini-
tially taken off-the-peg from inferential
statistics, but later designed in-house to
meet the peculiar features of economic
geographical data (cf.spatial autocor-
relation; Gould, 1969a).
(3) The use of computers, at first very crude
and limited, but within a decade per-
forming hitherto unimaginable calcula-
tions for instrumental purposes.

(4) A philosophical justification based on

some form ofpositivism, the idea that

only scientific knowledge is authentic

knowledge (seescience).

(5) A focus on abstract spatialities and

geometrically defined location (cf.loca-

tional analysis,space-economy). Con-

sequently, theeconomywas conceived

asan independentspatial object, with

its own causative powers, morphological

form and internal generative processes.

Regions remained part of the economic

geographical lexicon, but conceived utterly

differently: as explanatory, theoretical and

instrumental, a spatial unit to achieve func-

tional objectives (cf.regional science). The

consequence was that people like Clarence

Fielden Jones (and his book) were no longer

recognisableaspartofthediscipline.Theywere

not in the same field, not on the same planet.

This often abstract, closed and narrowly

conceived discipline did not last. It was out

of synch with its own disciplinary history,

and increasingly out of synch with its own

historical moment (seerelevance).radical

geographyemerged during the 1970s, pro-

pelling economic geography in a different dir-

ection. Harvey’s (1999 [1982]) classical Marxist

theorizing of capitalist accumulation and

crisiswas important (seemarxism), but even

more so was Massey’s (1984) work on indus-

trialrestructuring, which was philosophic-

ally underpinned byrealismand culminated

in thelocalityproject that dominated British

economic geography during the late 1980s

(Cooke, 1989) (although disavowed by both

Massey and Harvey). Across the Atlantic, a

group of radical economic geographers in

California carried out important empirical

and theoretical work – not on cases ofcapit-

alism’s decline (as in studies ofdeindustrial-

ization in the UK), but on its successes,

such as high-tech industries (Scott, 1988b;

Saxenian, 1994). Merging British and

American interests from the late 1980s pro-

duced discussions around the transformation

of an old, disintegratingfordisminto a new,

emerging post-fordism (Tickell and Peck,

1992). Heavily influenced theoretically by

Frenchregulation theory, which was more

open-ended, and less abstract and determinis-

tic than classical Marxism, the economy

remained central, but it was softened by rec-

ognition of the social institutions, and even the

culture, in which it was embedded.

culture and ‘embeddedness’ became

keywords of the ‘cultural turn’ entering

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ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY