The Sudan Handbook

220 thE sudan handbook

But Khartoum’s own momentum began to fade by 1995. Internation-

ally it was now isolated as its former allies, Ethiopia and Eritrea, became

alarmed about its political intentions in the region, and Uganda was also

hostile to Khartoum’s support of the LRA. From 1996 to 1999 the SPLA

made significant advances in the south, the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile

and, in alliance with the NDA, the Eastern Sudan.

The Nasir faction failed to create a cohesive movement. Personal

opposition to Garang was not enough to unite the different commanders.

The movement had difficulty even deciding on a name, calling itself

in succession SPLA-Nasir Faction, SPLA-United, and the South Sudan

Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A). The underlying contradic-

tion of claiming to be fighting for the total independence of the south

while collaborating more or less openly with Khartoum against the

SPLA could not be resolved. The movement fractured and many of its

commanders went back to the SPLA. In desperation Riek Machar, now

virtually deserted by his army, signed a ‘Peace Charter’ with Khartoum in

1996, which was followed by the Khartoum Agreement of 1997, ostensibly

committing Khartoum to allowing the south to vote, at some undeter-

mined date in the future, on unity or independence.

The Khartoum Agreement did not stop the factionalism within the

anti-Garang southern forces, and in fact that factionalism intensified as

Riek and Paulino Matip fought for control of the Western Upper Nile

oil fields. Khartoum’s clear preference for Matip eventually led to Riek

Machar rejoining the SPLM in 2002.

But Khartoum was able to use these splinter groups to open up the

oil fields for exploitation. From 1999 the oil revenues that now came on

stream gave Khartoum a new edge and increased its war capability. The

Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) developed a new strategy in the oil fields by

combining air power with regular army units and militias in operations

designed to depopulate strategic areas. This strategy was adapted to

other theatres as well, notably northern Bahr al-Ghazal and the Nuba

Mountains. The SPLA responded by trying to intensify activities along

other fronts, most notably eastern Sudan.

The Sudan Handbook, edited by John Ryle, Justin Willis, Suliman Baldo and Jok Madut Jok. © 2011 Rift Valley Institute and contributors

(www.riftvalley.net).