The Sudan Handbook

(Barré) #1
tWEntiEth-CEntuRy CiVil WaRs 221

Escalation of Fighting during the Peace Negotiations

Peace negotiations under the auspices of the regional Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development (IGAD) were started in 1993 but had been
moribund for many years. Following the 9/11 attacks in 2001 the Bush
administration in the US brought a new commitment to supporting
the IGAD talks, and in 2002 a ceasefire was established in the Nuba
Mountains and peace talks were restarted in earnest at Machakos in
Kenya. The Machakos Protocol, signed on 20 July 2002, established
the framework of the future peace agreement, committing both sides
to the unity of the country, but granting the south the option of an
independence referendum after an interim period. But the agreement
was between the government and the SPLM only. Neither the NDA nor
any other opposition group in any other part of the Sudan was included.
A number of Darfur leaders petitioned IGAD to be included in the peace
talks late in 2002, but their request was declined. This was to have a
significant impact on events in Darfur in 2003.
More than two years passed before the outline agreed at Machakos
produced the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in January 2005.
During that time fighting intensified in many areas, despite agreements
to the cessation of hostilities and the protection of civilians. Khartoum
continued to clear civilian populations out of the oil fields area and, when
Lam Akol finally rejoined the SPLM, sent the militias and army in a sweep
through the Shilluk kingdom as well. When fighting in Darfur escalated
in early 2003, it transferred its oil fields strategy to Darfur, co-ordinating
attacks on civilian targets by militias supported by the air force, and
followed up by the army. It manipulated the cease fire agreements it
signed to shift troops from one theatre to another: moving troops out
of the Nuba Mountains into the adjacent oil fields in 2002, and moving
troops out of the south into Darfur after 2003. Despite the presence of
a US State Department-funded Civilian Protection Monitoring Team, its
continued attacks on civilians in the south brought no sanctions, no inter-
national retribution, no public condemnation, establishing a precedent
that Khartoum took note of as it expanded its war effort in Darfur.
The Sudan Handbook, edited by John Ryle, Justin Willis, Suliman Baldo and Jok Madut Jok. © 2011 Rift Valley Institute and contributors


(www.riftvalley.net).

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