9781118041581

(Nancy Kaufman) #1
Price Competition 369

TABLE 9.2
A Price War

Each firm’s optimal
strategy is to set
a low price.

Firm 2
High Price Low Price

High Price 10, 10 5, 12
Firm 1
Low Price 12, 5 7, 7

units. (The market-wide price reduction spurs total sales.) Finally, if one firm
sets a high price and the other a low price, the former sells 1.25 million units,
the latter 6 million units.
Table 9.2 presents a payoff table summarizing the profit implications of
the firms’ different pricing strategies. Firm 1’s two possible prices are listed in
the first and second rows. Firm 2’s options head the two columns. The upper-
left cell shows that if both firms charge high prices, each will earn a profit of
$10 million. (It is customary to list firm 1’s payoff or profit first and firm 2’s pay-
off second.) Each firm’s profit is computed as: (P AC)Q (8 4)(2.5)
$10 million. The other entries are computed in analogous fashion. (Check
these.) Notice that firm profits are lower when both charge lower prices. (The
price reduction increases the firms’ total sales, but not by enough to compen-
sate for lower margins. Demand is relatively inelastic.) Notice also that if one
firm undercuts the other’s price, it wins significant market share and, most
important, profit at the expense of the other.
Each firm must determine its pricing decision privately and independ-
ently of the other. Naturally, each seeks to maximize its profit. What pricing
policy should each firm adopt? The answer is that each should set a low
price. Indeed, this is each firm’s more profitable alternative, regardless of
what action its rival takes. To see this, let’s look at the payoffs in Table 9.2
from firm 1’s point of view. To find its best strategy, firm 1 asks a pair of
“what if” questions about its rival. What if firm 2 were to charge a high price?
Then, clearly, firm 1 does best by setting a low price, that is, undercutting.
(A profit of 12 is superior to a profit of 10.) Alternatively, if firm 2 sets a low
price, firm 1’s profit-maximizing response is to set a low price, that is, to
match. (Here, 7 is better than 5.) Because the firms face symmetric payoffs,
exactly the same logic applies to firm 2. In short, self-interest dictates that
each firm set a low price; this is the better strategy for each, regardless of the
action the other takes.
The upshot of both sides charging low prices is profits of 7 for each—lower
than the profits (10 each) if they both charged high prices. Both would prefer
the larger profits enjoyed under a high-price regime. Yet the play of self-interested

c09Oligopoly.qxd 9/29/11 1:32 PM Page 369

Free download pdf