of motion. The particularity of a contradiction constitutes the basis
for the immense variety of things in the world. Qualitatively different
contradictions can only be resolved by qualitatively different methods
(Mao,1954b: 22–35). It may be added here that the emphasis on
the particularity of the contradictions (i.e., the unique nature within a
thing) goes hand in hand with the principle of seeking truth from facts
(i.e., the totality of the particular reality of a thing).
Concerning the particularity of contradiction, Mao suggested that
the principal contradiction needs to be singled out for analysis (Mao,
1954b: 35–42). During the development of a complex thing, there are
many contradictions. However, it is ‘‘necessarily the principal contra-
diction whose existence and development determines or influences the
existence and development of other contradictions’’ (Mao,1954b:
35). One example Mao offered was that in rural China, there were
many pairs of forces in contradiction, but the contradiction between
the landless peasants and the landowners formed the principal one.
The other contradictions, such as that between the kulaks and the
poor peasants and the conflict amidst poor peasants and so on, are
all determined or influenced by theprincipal contradiction between
the landless peasants and the landowners (Mao,1954b: 35). Mao
contended that at every stage in the development of a process,
‘‘whatever happens, there is onlyone principal contradiction that
plays the leading role’’ (Mao,1954b: 37). The behavioral guideline
from this, Mao taught, is that in studying any complex process
in which there are two or more contradictions, every effort must be
made to find the principal contradiction. Once this principal contra-
diction is pinpointed and grasped, all problems can be readily solved
(Mao,1954b: 42). Mao used an analogy for illustration: ‘‘Once
the head-rope of the fishing net is pulled up, all its meshes open’’
(gang-ju-mu-zhang).
The struggle between the two contradictory elements contained in a
thing, Mao argued, will lead to a dialectical process of development.
In the motion of all things, there are two states, ‘‘the form of relative
rest and the form of conspicuous change’’ (Mao,1954b: 48). In the
first state of motion, a thing is undergoing only quantitative and not
qualitative change, resulting in an outward appearance of stability or
being at rest. The second state of motion arrives when the quantitative
change of a thing in the first state has reached a critical point, giving
rise to the dissolution of the thing as an entity. As a result, a qualitative
212 Xin-an Lu and Jie Lu