of the For-itself as “diasporatic (BN 136 ). This simply reiterates the basic
nonself coincidence of the for-itself. But it is a feature of phenomenology
to conceive of time as constituting “a unity of a new type,” which Sartre
calls “ekstatic unity” (BN 134 ). The “unity” of the for-itself is not that
of a substance (which would be in-itself); rather the for-itself “is its own
nothingness and...can exist only in the ontological unity of its ekstases”
(BN 171 ).
Viewing the three temporal dimensions in terms of the ontology
elaborated in the previous chapters, Sartre describes the past in terms
of a perpetually surpassed facticity that “haunts” the For-itself at the
very moment that the For-itself acknowledges itself as not being this or
that particular thing. Note that for Sartre “haunting” denotes a kind
of presence in absence, a sort of being “present but out of reach” rather
than a causal relationship – which belongs to the in-itself, as we shall see.
Approaching the psychological, Sartre describes the Past as “that con-
stantly givendensity of the worldwhich allows me to orient myself and
to get my bearings. It is myself in so far as I am myself as a person (there
is also a structure to-come of the Ego). In short, the Past is my contin-
gent and gratuitous bond with the world and with myself inasmuch as
I constantly live it as a total renunciation.”^4
The future is associated with the lack and the possible. It reaches
me as a “not-yet,” and designates me as “an unachieved totality which
can never be achieved” (BN 141 ). The two ekstases of past and future
underscore the fact that the For-itself is neveritself– what he calls “the
ontological mirage of the Self ” (BN 137 ).^5 And this occasions the
observation that “this is why value in itself is by nature self-repose,
non-temporality! The eternity which man is seeking is not the infinity
of duration...[but] the atemporality of the absolute coincidence with
himself ” (BN 141 – 142 ).
In the third temporal dimension of ekstatic temporality, presence
to being, the For-itself, “dispersed in the perpetual game of
(^4) BN 141 , emphasis added to resonate with a similar remark made about Kierkegaard some
twenty years later: “Let us note at the outset that between [Kierkegaard] and us, History has
taken place. No doubt it is still going on. But its richness puts a distance,an obscure density
5 between him and us” (“Kierkegaard: The Singular Universal,”BEM^149 ).
In hisNotebooks for an Ethics, Sartre speaks of authenticity or “authentic existence” involving
freeing oneself from the Ego by pure reflection to achieve full autonomy (NE 478 – 482 ). For
the initial discussion of authenticity inCDG, see above 165 ff.
Temporality: the ontology 199