reflection-reflecting,^6 escapes itself in the unity of one and the same
flight” (BN 142 ). And though none of these three dimensions has any
ontological priority over the others, Sartre insists that “it is best to put
the accent on the present ekstasis and not on the future ekstasis as
Heidegger does,” for it is in the present that the past and the future
are revealed respectively as that which it has to be as a nihilating
surpassing and as a lack “haunted” by its possible (BN 142 ). In sum,
“temporality is the mode of being peculiar to being-for-itself. The For-
itself is the being which has to be its being in the diasporatic form of
Temporality” (BN 142 ).
The dynamic of temporalityIt is here that Sartre considers the problem of duration beqeathed him
by the person whose reflections initiated his interest in philosophy as a
student, Henri Bergson. Though he criticizes him by name elsewhere in
the book, it is the Bergsonian problem of relating, indeed of equating
duration and spontaneity, that concerns Sartre here. The previous con-
sideration of the three dimensions of temporality teaches us nothing
about the problem of duration (Bergson’s signature concept). Why does
the For-itself undergo that modification of its being which makes it
becomepast? And why does a new For-itself ariseex nihiloto become
the Present of this Past? This is the problem of change and of novelty,
not addressed in the static analysis just completed.
Regarding the first question, Sartre repliespaceLeibniz and Kant,
that the foundation of change is not permanence but the temporality
itself of the For-itself. “It is the temporality of the For-itself which is the
foundation of change and not the change which furnishes the foundation
for temporality” (BN 144 ). “If what changesisits former state in the
past mode,” Sartre argues, “this is sufficient to make permanence super-
fluous. In this case change can be absolute ...and the problem
of duration ought to be posited in relation to absolute changes” (BN
143 ). Sartre is siding with Heraclitus. And since we are dealing with
human reality, what is necessary is pure and absolute change, “which can
very well be in addition a change withnothingwhich changes and which
is actual duration” (BN 144 ).
(^6) Readingreflet-refletantforreflete-refletant(BN 142 ;F 188 ).
200 Bad faith in human life:Being and Nothingness