ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
environment in advanced industrialised nations worsened through the
1970s with a general deterioration in key pollution indicators, including
sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, particulates, carbon monoxide and car-
bon dioxide (OECD 1991 ). Although some trends were reversed in the 1980s,
notably a decline in sulphur dioxide emissions, others, notably carbon diox-
ide, worsened (European Environment Agency, http://www.eea.eu.int/), whilst
theappearance of new problems such as acid rain and climate change
posed novel challenges to policymakers. The weaknesses in the traditional
paradigm have become increasingly apparent to policy elites, yet, despite
the emergence of the alternative paradigm of sustainable development, the
traditional paradigm has proved very resistant to change.◗ Political obstacles to change
The traditional paradigm is bolstered by two core characteristics of the policy
process: first, the privileged position of business and producer groups; sec-
ondly, sectoral divisions within the institutional structure of government
both reflect and reinforce a special-interest approach to public policy in
which each ministry tends to act as a sponsor for the key producer or
professional groups within its policy sphere. This section uses theories of
state–group relations and policy network analysis to show how the power
of producers and the fragmented nature of government have reinforced the
traditional paradigm.◗ The power of producers
In political science, it is common to explain policy outcomes in terms of
thepower exercised by competing interests. This section uses some central
theoriesof state–group relations (pluralist, neo-pluralist, neo-Marxist)^4 and
the theory of three-dimensional power (Lukes 1974 )toexplain the continu-
ing strength of the traditional paradigm in shaping environmental policy
outcomes.
Thepluralistmodel regards public policy as the outcome of competition
among different groups. For every environmental issue there will be a wide
range of institutions, organisations and interest groups seeking to influence
theformation and implementation of public policy. Each interest group will
use the resources at its disposal – expertise, finance, membership, public
opinion – to influence policy outcomes. It is assumed that power is diffuse:
no single group or set of interests dominates the decision process, many
groups can gain access to government and, if sufficiently determined, most
groups can achieve at least some of their objectives. The government will
obviously have its own preferences on many subjects, but it will consult
widely and respond to powerful outside demands (Dahl 1961 ).
Of course, not every group has equal influence. In particular, a primary
aim of any government is to manage the economy, so in core economic