The environment as a policy problemsectors it regularly consults and seeks the co-operation of business groups
(Truman 1951 ). Environmental policy often has a direct impact on busi-
nesses, so they will mobilise against proposed (or existing) regulations or
eco-taxes, or to win approval for a new development such as a motorway or a
dam. As insider groups, businesses will usually remain within the law: lobby-
ing politicians and civil servants, financing publicity campaigns or funding
sympathetic pressure groups. Sometimes producers may threaten to flout
legislation or even take direct action to make their case; French farmers
have an unrivalled record in achieving their aims by blocking roads and
ports.
Pluralist accounts therefore concede that producers have both the moti-
vation and the means to play an active role in the policy process, but they
do not regard business as a privileged participant. Businesses may exer-
cise disproportionate influence compared to environmental groups because
theyhave more resources at their disposal. The pluralist would anticipate
that when environmental groups are able to mobilise sufficient resources
tocounter the strength of business, they too should win better access to
government and a matching influence over policy outcomes (unless, like
Greenpeace, they deliberately resist entry for fear of being ‘captured’). Yet,
in practice, in many key areas affecting the environment, those ‘insider’ pres-
sure groups operating closest to government typically consist of a handful
of powerful producer interests.^5 Governments regard the views of key pro-
ducer groups as legitimate and important, so they benefit from good access
toministers and civil servants to discuss matters affecting their interests
and they are regularly consulted by government officials. Conversely, envi-
ronmental and consumer groups are often ‘outsider’ groups excluded from
the corridors of power; they are less routinely consulted and they may strug-
gle to get theirvoice heard by government. Consequently, more often than
not, policy outcomes show the interests of producer groups trumping those
of environmentalists.
One weakness of pluralism is its use of an incomplete, one-dimensional
model of power which underestimates the influence of business interests
(Lukes 1974 )(seeBox7. 3). Pluralists focus onobservableinfluence, exam-
ining each individual decision to assess whether the preferences of busi-
ness groups hold sway. However, Bachrach and Baratz ( 1962 )argue that
observable power measures only one aspect of power. They identify a sec-
ond dimension of power – ‘non-decision-making’ – which refers to the abil-
ity of powerful groups to keep issues off the agenda. Producer groups can
manage conflict before it even starts by using political routines to produce
or reinforce dominant values and interests, suppress dissenting demands
or co-opt challenging groups, a process that Schattschneider ( 1960 ) called
the‘mobilisation of bias’. In practice, observable ‘pluralist’ decision-making
is frequently confined to safe issues that do not threaten the fundamen-
tal interests of the dominant (producer) groups, while the grievances of
those interests excluded from the policy process, such as environmental