The Politics of the Environment: Ideas, Activism, Policy, 2nd Edition

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

7.3 The three dimensions of power

First dimension

Ahas power overBto the extent thatAcan get

Bto do something thatBwould not otherwise

do.AdefeatsBby mobilising superior

bargaining resources in open conflict over

clearly defined issues.

Second dimension

Aconstructs a barrier against the participation

ofBin decision-making –Aengages in

‘non-decisions’ and uses the ‘mobilisation of

bias’ to suppress or thwart challenges toA’s

values or interests byB.

Third dimension

Ainfluences or shapes the consciousness ofB

to accept inequalities (through myths,

information control, ideology) and to induce a

sense of powerlessness and acceptance inB.

Very difficult to detect.

Based on Lukes ( 1974 ). See discussion of Crenson

(1971) for examples of each dimension.

groups, are marginalised. Indeed, opposition groups may not even raise their

dissenting views in the formal policy process because of a fatalistic assump-

tion that they will be rejected by the dominant producer interests.

Aclassic environmental illustration of non-decision-making is provided

in Crenson’s ( 1971 )study of air pollution in two neighbouring American

steel towns: East Chicago and Gary. Whereas East Chicago introduced leg-

islation controlling air pollution in 1949, Gary delayed acting until 1963,

even though the pollution problem was identical in the two towns. A key

difference between the towns was that, whilst many steel companies were

located in East Chicago, just one big corporation, US Steel, dominated Gary.

US Steel did not lobby overtly against regulation, but it was able to exercise

enormous indirect influence because local political leaders feared that the

company might leave the town if anti-pollution laws were introduced. Envi-

ronmental groups saw little point in even seeking to raise the issue of air

pollution because they anticipated the negative reaction of US Steel were

theytodo so. Yet no observable decision opposing anti-pollution legislation

wasevertaken; it was a ‘non-decision’. By contrast, the fragmentation of

thesteel industry in East Chicago made the negative employment impact of

legislation less risky and allowed proponents of legislation to get pollution

control on the agenda much earlier.

This broader two-dimensional model of power underpins theneo-pluralist

theory of state–group relations which, like pluralism, sees businesses as exer-

cising power through their ability to mobilise resources in the political arena

but, in contrast to pluralism, claims that they also possess structural power.

Lindblom ( 1977 )provides a forceful elaboration of the view that business

holds a privileged interest within the political system owing to its structural

importance in the capitalist economy. Any government in a liberal democ-

racy will routinely take account of producer interests in its decision-making

because the overall performance of the economy is likely to influence its

popularity, and hence its chances of re-election. Governments therefore