ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
governments do overrule producer objections, as illustrated by the raft of
environmental regulations introduced over the past thirty years. Nor should
it be assumed that producers will always oppose measures to protect the
environment. Sometimes producers are persuaded by the environmental
‘argument’ to change their behaviour; sometimes – as the discussion of eco-
logical modernisation in Chapter8 demonstrates – there is a commercial
advantage to be gained. Certainly the current shift towards organic farm-
ing in many countries is driven by both considerations, whilst wind tur-
bine manufacturers and many energy generators are strong advocates for
an expansion of wind power. However, on balance, it seems that business
power has been used to reinforce the traditional paradigm.Critical question 2
Is industry the main villain in environmental policy?◗ Administrative fragmentation
Another factor giving some interest groups disproportionate access to the
policy process is the institutional structure of the state. The fragmentation
of government into sectoral divisions produces a special-interest approach
to public policy in which each ministry tends to act as a sponsor for the key
groups of producers or professionals within its policy sphere. Agriculture
ministers typically see themselves as speaking on behalf of farmers, rather
than acting to protect consumer interests or the environment. Similarly,
energy ministers see their role as protecting the commercial interests of
themajor energy producers in the coal, oil, gas and nuclear industries, so
theymay downplay the environmental damage associated with the energy
sector. Each policy sector is characterised by administrative arrangements
that reflect the underlying power relations between the concerned inter-
est groups. Thus in most countries, pluralistic patterns of environmental
policymaking seem to be the exception rather than the rule. Even in the
USA, a relatively pluralistic political system, the widely used ‘iron trian-
gle’ metaphor acknowledges the enormous influence of producer groups
in key policy areas where decision-making is dominated by three powerful
actors: congressional committee, administrative agency and producer group
(Cater 1965 ). The congressional sub-committee provides money and monitors
regulations, the bureau hands over the money or enforces the regulation,
and the producer group is the benefiting special interest. Each actor needs
theothers, so this cosy relationship would break down without the par-
ticipation of the others; conversely, it is in their mutual interest to limit
the access of other actors to the policy process. Thus it is an ‘iron’ trian-
glebecause it is largely impenetrable to outsiders.^7 In this section a similar
institutional model of the policy process –policy network analysis–isused
to support the argument that the sectoral fragmentation of government