The environment as a policy problemfurther entrenches the structural power of producer groups over many areas
of environmental decision-making.
Policy network analysis examines the relationship between actors involved
in the public policy process (Rhodes 1988 ; Marsh and Rhodes 1992 ;Smith
1993 )and there is evidence that policy networks exist in most countries,
including the USA (Heclo 1978 ), Canada (Pross 1992 ), several European coun-
tries (Kickert et al. 1997 ; Marsh 1998 )and within the EU policy process
(Peterson and Bomberg 1999 ). Policy networks are clusters of public and
private actors connected to each other by resource dependencies, such as
information, expertise, money and legitimacy, and separated from other
clusters by breaks in the structure of resource dependencies. Marsh and
Rhodes ( 1992 )distinguish two ideal types of policy network at opposite ends
of a continuum: policy communities and issue networks.
Thepolicy communityhas a closed and stable membership, usually involv-
ing a government ministry or agency and a handful of privileged producer
groups, who regularly interact and share a consensus of values and predis-
positions, almost a shared ideology, about that policy sector that sets the
community apart from outsider groups. The cement that joins the members
of the policy community together is their mutual resource dependency: each
has resources that can be exchanged or bargained with so that a balance of
power prevails, allowing every member to benefit from a positive-sum game.
Through their ability to control the agenda, the members produce continu-
ity and stability in policy outcomes that transcend changes in the political
complexion of government and are largely immune from the gaze and con-
trol of either the legislature or the public. According to Smith ( 1993 : 66–74),
policy communities provide the state with four advantages: a consultative
policymaking environment; a consensual, depoliticised policy arena; pre-
dictable, stable surroundings; and a reinforcement of policy segmentation
by the buildingofbarriers against encroachment by other ministries.
In contrast, the openissue networkhas many competing groups with fluc-
tuating membership and less regular interaction. The government tends to
consult rather than bargain with members of this more pluralistic network.
As a result, policy outcomes are far less stable and predictable. It is impor-
tant to note that the policy community and issue network are at opposite
ends of a continuum, and various hybrid networks exist between these two
poles.^8
The significance of policy network analysis in explaining the strength
of the traditional paradigm lies in the prevalence of policy communities in
those policy sectors where environmental issues impinge on major economic
interests and the government is dependent on producer groups for imple-
mentation. Here the power and interests of producers and the fragmented
administrative structure become mutually reinforcing; neither producers
nor the state want anything to disrupt this cosy situation. So, how com-
mon are policy communities and, where they exist, how do they influence
environmental policy outcomes?