Global environmental politicsof experts from thirty-two countries drew up a World Plan of Action on
the Ozone Layer to co-ordinate future research, but not until the discovery
in 1985 of a ‘hole’ in the ozone layer above the Antarctic – regular spring-
time decreases of ozone in excess of 40 per cent between 1977 and 1984 –
did a scientific consensus about the existence of ozone depletion begin to
emerge. This consensus was completed in 1988 when the Ozone Trends
Panel, representing over a hundred leading atmospheric scientists from ten
countries, concluded that the ozone layer in the Northern Hemisphere had
been reduced by up to 3 per cent between 1969 and 1986: ‘ozone layer
depletion was no longer a theory; at last it had been substantiated by hard
evidence’ (Benedick 1991 :110). Crucially, the panel also confirmed that CFCs
and other synthetic chemicals were the primary cause of ozone depletion.
Meanwhile, international negotiations had gradually picked up pace. In
1977, the USA, Canada, Norway, Sweden and Finland (collectively known as
theToronto Group) together urged UNEP to consider remedial action; when
this was not forthcoming they took unilateral action to ban non-essential
aerosol uses of CFCs. The European Community (EC), which accounted for
45 per cent of world CFC production, strongly resisted such action. In the
absence of firm scientific evidence, EC member states were subjected to
strongindustrial lobbying to protect export markets and avoid the costs of
developing substitutes. When multilateral negotiation of a framework con-
vention commenced in 1982, the representatives from twenty-four nations
were broadly divided between the Toronto Group, which pushed for a com-
plete ban on non-essential uses of CFCs, and the European Community,
which would only consider a cap on production. Unable to resolve this fun-
damental conflict, the resulting 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection
of the Ozone Layer represented little more than an agreement to co-operate
on monitoring, research and information exchange, for it imposed no tar-
gets or controls to reduce CFC production, although the USA was able to
win an important commitment to start negotiations for a binding protocol
(Benedick 1991 : 45–6). Nevertheless, the Vienna Convention was significant
because it was signed without firm scientific evidence that ozone depletion
washappening – the first instance of international environmental law based
(implicitly) on the precautionary principle.
During the nine months of negotiations leading up to the signing of the
Montreal Protocol in September 1987, the European Community and Japan
shifted from resistance to any cut in production to acceptance of a compro-
mise proposal to reduce CFC production by 50 per cent of 1986 levels by
1999 and to freeze halon production at 1986 levels by 1992. Several factors
contributed to this dramatic change of heart. Opponents were subjected
toenergetic US diplomatic manoeuvring. The negotiations were handled
skilfully by Mustafa Tolba, UNEP’s executive director. European states were
increasingly split as West Germany, under strong domestic political pres-
sure to make concessions, disagreed with the other major CFC producers,
France, Italy and the UK. Most important, though, was the firming up of