ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
scientific evidence following the discovery of the ozone hole, which had a
profound impact on national representatives and even influenced industrial
interests (Brenton 1994 :140–1). Again, as the Ozone Trends Panel report
proving the link between CFCs and ozone depletion only appeared several
monthsafterthe Montreal Protocol was signed, it was significant that politi-
cians had signed an agreement in advance of scientific evidence supporting
their action (Seaver 1997 : 33–4).
Soon after the Ozone Trends Panel report Dupont declared that it would
accelerate research into substitutes and stop manufacturing all CFCs and
halons by the end of the century – a declaration swiftly followed by other
major international chemical producers (Benedick 1991 : 111–15). This scien-
tific evidence led to further strengthening of the regime at follow-up meet-
ings of the signatories, both by ratcheting forward reduction and phase-
out dates so that production of CFCs, halons and three other chemicals
had halted in developed countries by 1996, and by extending the Pro-
tocol to further chemicals, such as hydrochlorofluorocarbon (HCFC) and
bromochloromethane.
One major problem unresolved at Montreal was the need to persuade
developing countries to participate in the regime. Industrialised nations, rep-
resenting 25 per cent of the world’s population, were responsible for almost
90 per cent of global CFC consumption, with a per capita consumption more
than twenty times higher than in less industrialised nations (Benedick 1991 :
148–9), so it was obviously incumbent on the former to take the initiative
in reducing emissions. However, the long-term success of the regime was in
jeopardy without the involvement of developing countries, notably China
and India, where the consumption of ozone-depleting substances in refrig-
eration and air-conditioning systems would grow with further industrialisa-
tion. Developing countries complained that they should not be expected to
incur the costs for resolving a problem that they did not cause, and insisted
that either they be allowed to continue using CFCs or that they receive
financial and technological help to develop substitutes. The Montreal Proto-
col contained no such facility, so only a handful of developing states signed
it; the three largest countries – Brazil, China and India – refused to do so
(Porter et al. 2000 : 90). Industrialised countries were reluctant to make open-
ended commitments to pay for a fund, with the USA particularly concerned
about the possible precedent for future environmental regimes, notably cli-
mate change. It was increasingly apparent that the success of the Protocol
depended on providing sufficient incentives to persuade developing coun-
tries to sign up. Consequently, the London meeting in 1990 established a
multilateral fund for financial and technology transfer to help developing
countries. The fund was $160 million, rising to $240 million if China and
India signed (which they eventually did), to be administered by UNEP, UNDP
and the World Bank. The allocation was subsequently increased and the mul-
tilateral fund had dispersed $1.86 billion by the end of 2005 (UNEP 2005 : 8).