The Economist - USA (2022-03-12)

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TheEconomistMarch12th 2022 Business 51

Thesenewinvestmentsmaydolessto
boostthebottomlinethanwasthecasein
thepast.Inrecentyearsforeigncountries
havecontributeda decliningshareofcor­
porateearnings,notjustbecausedomestic
profits have soared but because foreign
oneshavestagnated.Inthethirdquarterof
2021 allAmericancompanies(bothlisted
andunlisted)earned18%oftheirprofits
abroad,comparedwith24%three years
earlier(seechart3).
Manyfactorsinfluencea multinational
company’sperformanceabroad,including
acountry’srecoveryfromthepandemic
andthestrengthofthedollar.American
firmsarewatchingtoseeifgovernments
advancea globalminimumcorporatetax—
morethan40% oftheirforeigndirectin­
vestmentisheldintaxhavens.Mostim­
portant,perhaps,geopoliticalriskscanno
longerbeignored.
StartwithRussia.Companiesthathave
announcedtheywillleavenowfacethe
difficulttaskofactuallydoingso.Exxon­
Mobilhascautionedthatitwouldbeun­
safesuddenlytoabandontheoilprojectit
operatesinRussia’sfareast.Somebosses
fearthat MrPutin will retaliateagainst
Westerncompaniesbyseizingtheirassets
in Russia. American companies can re­
structuretoholdtheirRussianbusinessin
a foreignjurisdiction,notesDavidPinsky
ofCovington&Burling,a lawfirm.That
mayletthemchallengeanystatetakeover
in international arbitration, rather than
putthemselvesatthemercy ofRussian
courts. SomeWestern firms may worry
thattheir exitcould hurtordinaryRus­
sians.ThesuspensionofVisaandMaster­
cardpaymentshasmadeit harderforthose
members of Russia’s middle class who
wanttofleeMrPutin’sregimetopayfor
ticketsoutofthecountry,forexample.
Companies’problemsinChina,a more
powerful autocracy, are less acute but
moreconsequentialinthelongterm.Chi­
na’seconomyisroughlytentimesthesize
of Russia’s. Tariffs imposed by Donald
Trumpduringhispresidencyremaininef­
fect—andineffective.TheEconomistesti­


matesthatmorethan$100bninChinese­
madegoodsmayhavedodgedAmerican
tariffslastyear.MrBidenhasbeenslowto
putforwarda newstrategy.Heintendsto
announcea frameworkforstrengthening
economictieswithothercountriesinAsia.
However, there is little support among
DemocratsorRepublicansfora multilater­
al trade deal. Fornow,many firmsfind
themselvesplayingbyChina’srules,both
withinthecountryandbeyond it.They
facestate­backedgiantsthataccountfor
27%oftheworld’stop 500 companiesby
revenue,comparedwith19%a decadeago.
Othercountrieswitha historyofeco­
nomic nationalism are dusting off old
ideas. India’s prime minister, Narendra
Modi,hasechoedMahatmaGandhi’scalls
forself­sufficiencyandimposedtariffsto
support local manufacturers. MrModi’s
governmentisdesigninganopen­source
platformfore­commerce,inparttochal­
lenge Amazon and Walmart’s Flipkart.
Mexico’sgovernment,ledbyAndrésMa­
nuelLópezObrador,hasbailedoutPemex,
thestate­ownedoilcompany.Lastyearan
American energy firm, backed by kkr’s
private­equitybarons,wasclosedatgun­
pointbyMexicanauthorities.
Evenmany lessnationalistic govern­
mentsaregettingbackintothebusinessof
shoringupindustriesdeemedcrucialto
national interests. South Korea, the eu
and,withbipartisanbacking,Americait­
selfwanttosupportdomesticproduction
ofsemiconductors.America’sSenateand
HouseofRepresentativeshaveeachpassed
a billaimedathelpingAmericacompete
globally. It brims withhandouts for re­
search,training andfavoured industries
(includingover$50bnforchipmaking).
Thenewprotectionismincludessticks
aswellascarrots.Thebillpassedbythe
House ofRepresentativeswouldimpose
capital controls, authorising the com­
mercedepartmenttoblockAmericancom­
panies’ investments in China. Europe’s
pursuit of“digitalsovereignty” seeks to
protect citizens’ data, crack down on
American tech firms andadvance local

competitors.Britainattractedone­fifthof
American companies’ foreign deals last
year,tothedismayofsomeBritishpoliti­
cians. In February Nvidia, an American
chip­designer, abandoned a $40bn at­
tempttobuyArm,a Japanese­ownedone
based in Britain. American trustbusters
feared the combined group’s effect on
competition; their British counterparts
worriedaboutnationalsecurity.
Americancompaniesaretryingtoad­
just.ToreducerelianceonChina,compa­
nies are increasingly sourcing products
and inputs from Taiwan, Thailand and
Vietnam.TheshareofAmericanimports
from other low­cost Asian countries
climbed from12.6%in 2018 to16.2%in
2020,accordingtoKearney,a consultancy.
Ordersofrobotsandotherautomatedsys­
temsinAmericahavesurpassedtheirpre­
pandemicpeak,suggestingthatmanufac­
turersareusingautomationtolowerpro­
duction costsathomeas atightlabour
marketraiseswagecosts.LastyearGeneral
MotorsfollowedTesla’sexampleandin­
vestedina lithiumprojectinCalifornia,to
boostsupplyofa commodityessentialto
itselectric­carstrategy.Americancarmak­
ersarebothrespondingtoandemulating
China’s state­backed firms, which have
longvaluedsecurityovermereefficiency.
Reconfiguringsupplychainsis,how­
ever,neither straightforward nor cheap.
Few countries can match China’s vast
pools of skilled workers, notes Stewart
Black of insead, a business school, so
Americancompaniesarelothtoabandon
itcompletely.Intel’sboss, PatGelsinger,
saidinJanuarythathewasseeking“adu­
plicityofsupply chainsavailable across
theglobe”.Thatincludesmanufacturingin
richcountrieswithhighercosts.“Youneed
eitherredundancyorresiliencybuiltinto
yoursystems,”saysDavidKostinofGold­
manSachs.Thealternativeistokeephigh­
erinventories,whichmakesfora lesseffi­
cientuseofworkingcapital.
Companies would,ofcourse, happily
acceptgovernmentlargessein exchange
forinvestments.Buthandoutsarenotthe

Greenerpastures?
UnitedStates,stockmarketindices
January1st2016=100

Source:Bloomberg

1

300

250

200

150

100

50
2221201918172016

S&P5ForeignRevenueExposure

S&P5

Geopolitical stakes
United States, net acquisition
of foreign-direct-investment assets*, $bn

Source: Bureau of
Economic Analysis

*Asset/liability basis
†To Q3

2

600

400

200

0

-200
2000 05 10 15 21†

Home, sweet home
United States

Source:BureauofEconomicAnalysis

3

45

30

15

0

3

2

1


2005 10 15 21

Quarterly corporate profits
$trn

Foreign profits
% of total

Foreign

Domestic
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