ARGUMENTS AGAINST MONOTHEISM 1416aa It is reasonable to believe that Bill’s animals are suffering, and
unreasonable not to do so.
Such cases do not give reason for us to raise our intellectual eyebrows or
think that the reasoner has exceeded proper limits. But it is not so clear
that things continue to go well if we reason:
4 For all we can tell, God (if God exists) has no morally sufficient
reason for allowing animal suffering.
5 We can find no evidence in favor of the view that God (if God exists)
has a morally sufficient reason for allowing animal suffering.^27
So it is proper to infer to
6* It is reasonable to believe that God (if God exists) has no morally
sufficient reason for allowing animal suffering, and unreasonable not
to do so.
Our ability to discern the truth about the situation concerning Bill
intentions, motives, and consequences, and the truth about Bill’s animals’
suffering, presumably is quite reliable. The same is not so clear regarding
the situation concerning God (if God exists) allowing animal suffering. To
the degree that this is so:
(2*) If there are imaginably but not contextually pointful evils then there
are actually pointless evils ( = Evils that are not contextually pointful
are actually pointless)
and
(2**) If there are unimaginably pointful evils then there are actually
pointless evils ( = Evils that are unimaginably pointful are actually
pointless)
are in trouble.
Salient to God’s situation regarding allowing animal suffering is this.
Rowe’s argument requires that it be true that Necessarily, if God exists
then there is no pointless evil. Given that claim, any evidence we have
for God’s existence is evidence against there being pointless evil. (It
need not be evidence against there simply being evil.) But no evidence
regarding Bill’s existence is automatically evidence against there being
pointless evil. Further, Bill’s capacities are like our own. His reasons for