142 ARGUMENTS: MONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONSaction, the range of his knowledge, the scope of his power are like ours.
If after careful reflection we cannot see any good reason Bill might have
for allowing his animals to suffer, this is some reason to think that he
has no such reason. It is, at least, insofar as it is true that if Bill had
some such reason, it would occur to us. Nonetheless, even with other
human persons, observing their behavior and its consequences is often
far easier than discerning their motives and intentions. Identifying any
cases of divine behavior and its consequences is more difficult than
doing the analogous thing regarding human behavior and its
consequences. Drawing conclusions about any divine motives and
intentions there may be is exquisitely difficult. This is very relevant to
(2*) and (2**). It is important to take into full account in considering
the principle of Common Reasoning.
Consider, then, these principles of reasoning:
(R) (For Roweanism) If a case in which one wishes to apply reasoning
of the sort 1–3 exhibits – Common Reasoning – is one dealing with
natural objects, artifacts, the means and ends of human persons, or
the means and ends of a person whose cognitive capacities, moral
goodness, and causal powers vastly exceed ours, then the results of
applying it is reasonably believed to be reliable.
(R*) If a case in which one wishes to apply reasoning of the sort 1–3
exhibits – Common Reasoning – is one dealing with natural
objects, artifacts, or other human persons, then applying it is
reasonably believed to be reliable; if a case in which one wishes to
apply reasoning of the sort 1–3 exhibits – Common Reasoning – is
one dealing with a person whose cognitive capacities, moral
goodness, and causal powers vastly exceed ours, it is reasonable to
think that such reasoning is as likely to be unreliable as it is to be
reliable.
The basic idea on which Rowe’s position rests is that (R) is true, and that
this gives a favorable presumption to:
(2*) If there are imaginably but not contextually pointful evils then
there are actually pointless evils ( = Evils that are not
contextually pointful are actually pointless)
and
(2**) If there are unimaginably pointful evils then there are actually
pointless evils ( = Evils that are unimaginably pointful are
actually pointless).