PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: A contemporary introduction

328 RELIGION, MORALITY, FAITH, AND REASON

If, regarding performing action A at time T, Jane has categorical freedom
of the sort defined by

(CF) Jane is categorically (or libertarianly) free with respect to lying at
T entails Jane’s lying is within her power at T and Jane’s
refraining from lying is within her power at T.

and (IHP*) is true, an interesting consequence follows: it is logically
impossible that Jane be caused to perform A at T.
Since the incompatibilist claims that Jane is morally responsible for
doing A at T entails Jane has categorical freedom regarding A at T, and
Jane has categorical freedom regarding A at T entails It is logically
impossible that Jane be caused to do A at T, the incompatibilist position
holds that Jane is morally responsible for doing A at T entails It is
logically impossible that Jane be caused to do A at T. It is, then,
logically impossible that anyone or even anything causes Jane to make
any choice or, more generally, perform any action that she makes or
performs categorically freely. Precisely what is essential to something
being an action for the compatibilist – that it be caused in a certain way

• is logically incompatible with something being an action for the
  incompatibilist. If one wants the difference put in terms of free action,
  what necessarily characterizes a free action on the incompatibilist
  account is logically incompatible with what characterizes a free action
  on a compatibilist account.
  One thing that follows is that, if incompatibilism is true, Case 3 – the
  third and more sophisticated of the alleged counterexamples to the
  Principle of Alternative Possibilities – cannot obtain; its description is
  logically inconsistent and so its occurrence is logically impossible.
  Hence it is worthless as a counterexample.
  One standard complaint regarding libertarianism, which claims not
  only that incompatibilism is true, but that we have categorical freedom,
  is that it does not offer a causal explanation of freely performed actions.
  But if libertarianism is true, it is logically impossible that there be a
  causal explanation of freely performed actions. Thus the complaint
  radically misunderstands its target.

Acting not a matter of causing actions

The idea that for Mary to act is not for Mary to cause her action is
important enough to receive some further attention. Suppose that the
following is true: