RELIGION AND MORALITY 329(A) Performing infinite (or an endless) number of instantaneous and
simultaneous (or nearly instantaneous and simultaneous) actions is
logically, or at least naturally, unavailable to any human person.
(B) Necessarily, if for an agent to act, she must cause herself to act, and if
causing oneself to act is itself an action, an agent acts only if she
performs an infinite (or an endless) number of instantaneous and
simultaneous (or nearly so) actions.
If (A) and (B) are true, it follows that:
(C) Performing an action is logically, or at least naturally, unavailable to hu-
man persons.
Since (C) is plainly false, and (A) and (B) entail (C), either (A) or (B) is
false. Since (A) seems plainly true, presumably (B) is false. This provides
another reason for a libertarian to reject the notion of an action as self-
caused: no human person could perform the task of self-causing a freely
performed action even if it were not logically impossible that a freely
performed action be caused.
The incompatibilist, then, in replying to Case 3 – the microchip case
where Ann can anticipate Mary’s thoughts – had best avoid the notion that
Mary causes her actions. The one offering Case 3 need not deny that if Ann
interferes, Mary is not responsible, and Case 3 is more plausible if that is
not denied. How then, if at all, do our most recent reflections aid the
incompatibilist in dealing with Case 3? Consider a refinement of Move 4:
Move 5: If Ann interferes, it is Ann, not Mary, who is doing the
deciding – Ann decides that Mary shall not send the
letter, and perhaps also that it shall seem to Mary that
Mary has decided this. But if Ann interferes then Mary
has not decided this. She has made no decision at all if
Ann interferes. Ann will interfere if Mary, uninterfered
with, does not choose not to send the letter. There
remain these alternatives to Mary: freely to choose not
to send the letter; not to choose freely not to send the
letter. Mary freely chooses not to send it, and relative to
that matter she is free. What she is free regarding, she is
responsible for. The principle (PA) is true of Mary’s
freely choosing that she will not send the letter. Since (in
accord with (PA)) she is libertarianly free regarding
freely choosing to send the letter, she is praiseworthy for
having so chosen. Since freely choosing not to send the
letter is, under the circumstances, sufficient for not