The Economist March 19th 2022 China 53Asked to describe China’s strategic goal,
diplomats at more than a dozen embassies
in Beijing are in near unanimity. They say
China wants a world order built around
spheres of influence, with China in control
of Asia, Russia wielding a veto over securi
ty arrangements in Europe and America
pushed back to its own shores. If such an
order is helped into existence by Russia’s
war in Ukraine, so be it. But China’s over
whelming interest is in its own rise, and
whether it will be blocked by America. In
China’s view, the main global contest is be
tween it and a declining America that is too
racist and vicious to allow an Asian giant to
become a peer.
Officials in Beijing respond to foreign
horror at China’s stance on Ukraine with a
mixture of swaggering bluster and blan
dishments. America is the object of blus
ter, with scholars and government advisers
declaring that the war has exposed Presi
dent Joe Biden’s weakness and his fear of
Mr Putin’s nuclear arsenal. They predict
that sanctions will fail to break Russia’s
will—a point of keen interest to China,
which knows it would face similar punish
ment were it to invade Taiwan.
In contrast, European governments
with markets and technologies to which
China wants access, notably Germany and
France, are being targeted with a charm of
fensive. Europeans are being told that
America wants to profit from the war,
while Europe pays the price in soaring oil
and gas prices and a flood of Ukrainian ref
ugees. It is time for Europeans to seek
more autonomy from America and deepen
ties with China, runs the message from
Chinese officials and academics.
In reality, China stands to gain more
than any other country from Russia’s isola
tion. Mr Xi and Mr Putin may share a bond
as nationalist strongmen, who both feel
under siege from America. Both are ob
sessed with the threat from democratic op
position movements, denouncing protests
from Hong Kong to Moscow as American
controlled colour revolutions. But it is not
so long since Russian leaders were wary of
growing dependent on China, a neighbour
with an economy and population ten times
larger than Russia’s (see chart 2).
Over the past 20 years Alexei Venedik
tov, the founder of Ekho Moskvy, an inde
pendent radio station recently closed by
the Russian authorities, has conducted an
informal but informative survey. Every
time he saw Mr Putin, or one of his security
advisers, he would name three threats—
China, Islamic terrorism and nato—and
ask them to rank them. In Mr Putin’s first
two presidential terms from 2000 to 2008,
Islamic terrorism came at the top, followed
by China then nato. After 2008, the order
changed: China was seen as the biggest
threat, followed by natothen Islamic ter
rorism. After Russia’s annexation of Cri
mea and pivot towards China, the order
changed again: nato, then Islamic terro
rism, then China. For Mr Putin, the inva
sion of Ukraine is not just a bid to regain
historic Russian territory. It is a war on the
West, and China is the most powerful
partner that Russia can see.
If Mr Putin is willing to strengthen Chi
na as a champion against America, Chi
nese experts see opportunities. “Before,
the Russians just talked and talked about
cooperation” in places such as the former
Soviet republics of Central Asia, says Wang
Yiwei of Renmin University. Russia still
dominates this region, including through
a trade zone controlled from Moscow, the
Eurasian Economic Union. But maybe,
says Mr Wang, Russia “will have to think
about looking east now, and not worrying
too much about Chinese influence.” Cold calculations
Russia may also have to give more leeway
to China in the Arctic, suggests a diplomat
in Beijing. China sees that region as a new
strategic frontier. It wants access to natural
resources there, including fishing
grounds. It would like to lay digital cables
across it to connect Asia and Europe. There
may be opportunities for Chinese firms to
build ports along Russia’s northern coasts,
as climate change opens new shipping
lanes. “A weakened Russia will be more
malleable,” predicts the diplomat.
China will retain close military ties
with Russia. These have been central to
their relationship in the postSoviet era,
with the two countries often staging exer
cises together. To the consternation of
some nato countries, their navies have
held manoeuvres in the Mediterranean
and the Baltic. An exercise involving some
10,000 Russian and Chinese troops in
northwest China last year was the first tofeature a joint commandandcontrol cen
tre and Russians using Chinese weapons.
But as the balance of power shifts ever
further in China’s favour, many analysts
expect that military exchanges will be
come increasingly attuned to China’s
needs. America and its allies worry that
Russia could help China modernise and
expand its nuclear arsenal. "Nuclear weap
ons are one area where China thinks that
Russia still possesses superior capabilities
in certain areas, and possesses richer oper
ational and training experience," says Zhao
Tong of the Carnegie Endowment for Inter
national Peace in Beijing.
Still, the two sides are far from estab
lishing the kind of interoperability that
America and its allies have built over de
cades. Their weapons systems aren’t wide
ly compatible. Language differences are an
obstacle, too: few on either side speak both
Chinese and Russian. They have no mutual
defence treaty. Russia supports China’s po
sition on Taiwan, but would probably look
the other way if it attacks. Neither country
wants to get involved in the other’s con
flicts. Nor are they operationally ready for
more than a joint counterterrorist, hu
manitarian or evacuation mission.
One question facing Chinese leaders
now is whether the benefits of such drills
are worth the political costs, not just in the
West, but among developing countries,
many of which also exercise with China
but have denounced Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine. China may prefer to postpone or
scale down drills with Russia rather than
suspend them completely. Russian preoc
cupation with Ukraine may provide a con
venient hiatus. Based on the timetable of
recent years, the next big combined exer
cise should take place this summer or au
tumn. It is not clear whether it will.
As rockets rain down on Ukrainian cit
ies, China’s diplomats have busied them
selves managing the tricky optics of their
waitandsee approach to Mr Putin’s war.
On March 16th Qin Gang, the Chinese am
bassador to America, wrote in the Wash-
ington Postthat: “Conflict between Russia
and Ukraine does no good for China. Had
China known about the imminent crisis,
we would have tried our best to prevent it.”
Alas, diplomats note, there are no signs
of his words being matched by Chinese ac
tions, involving pressure on Mr Putin to
stop the killing. Russian savagery may be
awkward for China, but a humiliating end
to Mr Putin’s invasion would be even less
welcome if it vindicates America and the
West. Meanwhile, China has begun lobby
ing against sanctions intended to make Mr
Putin pay for his crime, especially if they
might ensnare Chinese firms. “Neither war
nor sanctions can deliver peace,” Mr Qin
argued. While much of the worldseeksan
urgent end to Ukraine’s agonies,Chinais
His new exercise routine biding its time and thinking ahead.n