Saddam Husseinquadrants in figure 18.1 represent the likely interaction patterns
with Other that we hypothesize are associated with the four types of
operational codes in the revised Holsti typology of belief systems dis-
cussed in chapter 9. The vertical axis in figure 18.1 is the continuum
of standard deviations for a leader's image of the political universe
(P-i) and approach to political strategy (I-i). The horizontal axis is
the continuum of standard deviations for a leader's attribution of his-
torical control to Self (P-4a) and Other (P-4b).
The Iraqi leader's I-i score for approach to goals and his P-4a score
for self s control over historical development place his generalized
image of Self in the type DEF quadrant in figure 18.1. His P-i score
for nature of the political universe and P-4b score for other's control
over historical development locate his generalized image of Other in
the type B quadrant. The strategic interaction implications in figure
- i for Saddam Hussein's general operational code as a type DEF
leader are that his definitely conflictual strategic orientation and
extremely low sense of historical control are likely to lead him to ini-
tiate bluffing tactics that will escalate to bully tactics if he does not
encounter firm opposition from Other.
Due to his extremely low sense of historical control, however, Sad-
dam Hussein is more likely to diagnose Other as a type B opponent
rather than a type DEF adversary. This diagnostic propensity to view
Other as a type B and his aversion to taking risks are likely to make
him relatively flexible and cautious if Other responds with hostility
toward him. This diagnosis of perceived power realities, however, is
not likely to lead Hussein to an unequivocal shift toward a coopera-
tive strategy. Instead, he is likely to implement a mix of bluff, bully,
and punish tactics that make him appear erratic rather than prag-
matic in his response to a stronger opponent.
Saddam Hussein's Integrative Complexity under StressPeter Suedfeld
The Persian Gulf Crisis—comprising the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in
the summer of 1990, a period of international negotiations, and the
subsequent coalition air and ground attack on Iraq early in 1991—
provided an uncommonly useful set of data for integrative complex-
ity research on Saddam Hussein's cognitive style. There were a num-