The Economist March 26th 2022 29
EuropeWarinUkraineThe concert of Europe
I
t may be called the European Union, but
it has often struggled to live up to its
name. Not in recent weeks. Ever since the
invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February
24th, the 27 member states of the euhave
acted as one. Cohesive in its aims and co
ordinated in its actions, Europe has basked
in its novel role as a firstrate power. Yet
the unifying effects of the original jolt are
starting to wear off. Ukraine’s demand that
Europe should now do much more to help
it is an early test of whether it can stay un
ited as the war grinds on.
The speed and determination with
which Europe initially acted startled even
old hands in Brussels. Previous crises—
whether the eurozone miasma a decade
ago or the bloc’s response to covid19—had
shown it could take months if not years for
the union to work effectively. The sight of
Russian bombs slaughtering civilians on
the bloc’s doorstep, in contrast, shocked
the euinto action.
Differences of emphasis remain, inev
itable in a club of democracies. But repeated meetings of leaders—the third in a
month was under way on March 24th as
The Economistwent to press, with Ameri
ca’s President Joe Biden in attendance—
have resulted in Europe making decision
upon momentous decision. Funds were
found to supply arms to Ukraine. Any Uk
rainian seeking safe haven in the eucan
walk in. Perhaps most important, tough
sanctions were agreed as war broke out.
Given that neither America nor Europe is
willing to intervene militarily, this was to
be the main tool. Few had expected much,
given that any of the 27 member states
could have vetoed sanctions.
Europe reached consensus, rather than
total agreement, before moving forward.
Unity was forged despite divisions over
how tightly to isolate Russia. “Sanctionis
tas” have pushed for a stricter embargo, in
cluding a ban on importing oil and gas.
Countries such as Poland and the Baltic
states worry that Russia might attack them
next; they say they would be willing to live
by candlelight if it means stopping moneyflowing to Moscow. A more hesitant bloc,
including Germany and Italy, has been
more reluctant to cut off the Russian ener
gy supplies they depend on.
In part thanks to outraged public opin
ion, the hesitant group found themselves
swept along into tougher measures than
anyone had thought feasible—though still
falling short of an energy embargo. Sergei
Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, this week
admitted the extent of the measures had
taken the Kremlin by surprise.
But the old divisions linger. Poland is
calling for a total ban on trade with Russia.
Germany remains firmly opposed to doing
more. “Sanctions should not hurt Euro
pean states harder than the Russian leader
ship,” said Chancellor Olaf Scholz on
March 23rd. (As often happens in eude
bates, other countries agree but are glad
not to have to make the case in public.) A
familiar sense of gridlock now looms.
As a result Ukrainians who once lauded
the benefits of European unity are now
questioning it. “What we saw in the begin
ning of the war was the rise of the Euro
pean Union as a powerful player that can
bring change,” says Dmytro Kuleba,
Ukraine’s foreign minister. “What I see in
the last ten days in the European Union is
backsliding back to its normality where it
cannot decide on strong and swift action.”
Mr Kuleba, speaking to The Economist
from an unspecified location in Ukraine,
sees early signs of “sanctions fatigue” inP ARIS
The eucame together over Ukraine. Staying as one is getting harder→Alsointhissection
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32 Charlemagne: The EU’s energy crisis