34 United States TheEconomistMarch26th 2022
Kennan imagined, such as the Marshall
plan to rebuild Europe. It also involved co
ercive instruments: military alliances and
buildups, nuclear standoffs, proxy wars
and much else short of a direct conflict.
Dean Acheson, Truman’s secretary of
state, wrote that America’s task after 1945
was “just a bit less formidable than that de
scribed in the first chapter of Genesis. That
was to create a world out of chaos; ours, to
create half a world, a free half, out of the
same material without blowing the whole
to pieces in the process.”
Mr Biden’s burden is to prevent the
world from reverting to chaos, and to pre
serve as much of the free portion as possi
ble. Russia today may be a lesser foe than
the Soviet Union, “a wounded empire”
rather than a superpower with a global ide
ology and a semiautarkic economic hin
terland, as Eliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins
University notes. Yet China is a greater
challenger, not least in economic terms. Its
navy is already larger than America’s, and it
is fast expanding its nuclear arsenal.
To judge Mr Biden, then, consider three
measures: first, how he deals with Russia;
in the longer term, how he confronts Chi
na; and, throughout, how he carries his
profoundly polarised country. Vladimir the terrible
Team Biden had no illusions about Russia.
Its early warning about the invasion of Uk
raine, and its release of intelligence about
the Kremlin’s plans, were innovative and
prescient. It denied Mr Putin a pretext, and
primed allies to respond forcefully, both by
arming Ukraine and by imposing severe
sanctions on Russia. Like Mr Putin, how
ever, Mr Biden may have underestimated
Ukraine. On the eve of war America seemed
to think that, at best, Ukraine might be
come another Iraq or Afghanistan, easy to
invade but hard to control. Instead Russia
has found it surprisingly arduous to take
Ukraine’s cities, even as it pulverises them.
The longer the horrors go on, the greater
the cries for the world to stop them.
At their summits in Europe, the West
ern allies will resolve to strengthen nato’s
defences, provide more weapons to Uk
raine and increase economic pressure on
Russia. Above all, American officials say,
they will stiffen their sinews for a long
contest as economic pain spreads.
How far dare the allies go in waging a
proxy war against a nuclear power? The an
swer keeps shifting. In 2014, when Russia
took a first chunk of Ukraine, America de
clined to provide weapons. It later began to
deliver antitank missiles. Now it is ship
ping small antiaircraft weapons and
drones. Soon it may facilitate the supply of
longerrange airdefence missiles.
Yet there are limits. When Mr Biden
vows that America will defend “every inch”
of nato’s territory he declares, in effect,that American forces will not defend any
inch of Ukraine’s. To get involved directly,
says Mr Biden, would be “World War III”.
He has refused calls to impose a nofly
zone over Ukraine, act as the intermediary
for Polish mig29 jets or even supply Amer
icanmade Patriot antiaircraft batteries.
The point at which America becomes a
“cocombatant” will not be decided by law
yers but, ultimately, by Russia. The Krem
lin has given notice that arms convoys to
Ukraine would be legitimate targets. It has
bombed sites close to Poland.
History suggests the boundaries of
proxy conflicts can be dangerously fuzzy.
Chinese “volunteer” forces fought against
American troops in the Korean war of 1950
53, when America considered using atom
bombs against them. Russians manned
antiaircraft batteries and, perhaps, flew
missions against American aircraft in theVietnamwarof195575.
“DuringthecoldwartheUnitedStates
and the Soviet Union were at daggers
drawnbutusuallydidnotstabeachother
directly,”explainsRichardFontaineofthe
Centre for a New American Security, a
thinktankinWashington.MrPutinhas
rattledhisnuclearsabre,butAmericanof
ficialssaytheyhavedetectednochangein
Russia’s nuclear posture, nor have they
changedtheirs.
MrBiden’scautioninUkrainecontrasts
withhisalmostcarelesstalkaboutdefend
ingTaiwanagainstChina.LastyearMrBi
densaidAmericahada “commitment”to
defendtheisland.America’s“strategicam
biguity”,wherebyitpromisestohelpTai
wandefenditselfbutwillnotsaywhether
it would intervene directly, has become
less ambiguous.
Nobody can say quite why America
seems readier to risk “World War III” for
Taiwan than for Ukraine. Perhaps the dan
ger in Ukraine is concentrating minds.
Some note that America has no alliance
with Ukraine, a nonnatocountry, where
as it has a semiobligation to Taiwan. The
island’s important semiconductor indus
try is a consideration. The main reason is
that America considers China, not Russia,
to be the greatest danger.
“Russia is the acute threat. But China is
the pacing challenge, the only country able
to challenge the United States systemical
ly,” says a senior American official. “Noth
ing about the crisis in Ukraine has changed
that.” Or, as one diplomat puts it, “Ukraine
is the tsunami; China is climate change.”
America’s response in Europe contributesThe price of freedom
United States, defence spending , % of GDPSource:OfficeofManagementandBudgetKorean war
breaks outUS enters
Vietnam warFall of
Berlin Wall9/
attacksEstimate20151050
22102000908070601946Atrailblazingdiplomat
Madeleine Albright, who died in Washington, dc, on March 23rd, served under Bill
Clinton as unambassador before becoming America’s first woman secretary of state.
She recalled America’s failure to stop the Rwandan genocide as her greatest regret.
nato’s eastward expansion was among her successes—and personal, given her history.
Born in Prague in 1937, with her family she fled Nazism, then communism. Mrs Albright
had thought that her family was Catholic. Only after she was secretary of state did she
learn that she was born Jewish and lost three of her grandparents in the Holocaust.