The Economist March 26th 2022 Middle East & Africa 47SyriaandtheGulfSpringtime for a pariah
B
asharal-assadhasfewoccasionsto
fish out his passport. The Syrian tyrant
has been largely confined to his own coun
try since 2011, when he set out to crush a
string of peaceful protests calling for re
form. As civic unrest turned into civil war,
he became a pariah. His few foreign forays
have been to Russia and Iran, wartime al
lies to whom he owes his survival.
On March 18th Mr Assad emerged from
isolation. He landed in the United Arab
Emirates (uae) for the sort of visit afforded
to any head of state. There was an honour
guard and a series of meetings with big
wigs. State media in the uae published
photos of Mr Assad with Muhammad bin
Zayed of Abu Dhabi (pictured above), the
country’s de facto ruler, and grinning with
the leader of Dubai, the flashiest Emirate.
Mr Assad’s first trip to an Arab country
since 2011 was both predictable and shock
ing. Predictable, because the uaehas spent
years pursuing a rapprochement with him.
In 2018 it reopened its embassy in Syria,
which (like many others) was shut in the
uprising’s early days. Abdullah bin Zayed,
the Emirati foreign minister, flew to Da
mascus last year and met Mr Assad. The
Emiratis had long been less eager than ma
ny of their partners to defenestrate Syria’s
dictator. They had feared that regime
change in Syria would bring Islamists,
whom they abhor, to power.
It was the timing that shocked. March
18th was the 11th anniversary of the first Fri
day protest in the southern city of Deraa, a
date many Syrians see as the start of their
revolution.Thesymbolismwasnotloston
them. The visit also came as Russia waged
war in Ukraine, using tactics honed over
seven years backing Mr Assad. Syria was
one of five countries to vote against a un
resolution damning Russia’s invasion.
The uaefeels that isolating Mr Assad
has not worked: making him a pariah not
only failed to depose him but left him reli
ant on Iran. Russia has been a bulwark
against Iranian hegemony in Syria, but,
with its army tied down in Ukraine and its
economy hobbled by sanctions, its influ
ence there is likely to ebb. Emiratis argue
that they (and other Arab states) should fill
the void. “The terrain changes, and we have
to adapt to the new terrain,” says a foreign
policy official. The uaehas called for Syria
to be reinstated in the Arab League, from
which it was suspended in 2011.
Western powers are not happy. Their
policy remains to isolate the man whose
war killed perhaps 500,000 people and dis
placed 13m. Asked if giving Mr Assad a
warm welcome helps bolster his regime,
Emiratis respond with a list of Western
failings in Syria, chief among them Barack
Obama’s decision in 2013 to ignore his own
“red line” against Mr Assad’s use of chemi
cal weapons. That he remains in power,
they argue, is a choice at least partly of the
West’s own making.
That charge is not meritless. Western
governments called for Mr Assad’s ouster
in 2011, but their support for the rebels try
ing to eject him was halfhearted. Painful
sanctions imposed by America and Europehave not compelled Mr Assad to change.
Some antiregime Syrians now argue that
they only deepen the country’s misery.
If the Emiratis can explain why they
welcomed Mr Assad, however, they strug
gle to articulate what their welcome might
achieve. He wants trade and aid to rebuild
his shattered country. Much of Syria looks
like a terrible place to invest in, but a few
projects could be lucrative for Emirati
firms. dp World, the Dubai ports giant, is
keen to invest in Tartous, a Mediterranean
harbour in a relatively calm part of Syria.
Whether that will buy Mr Assad’s favour
is another matter. Like his father Hafez,
who ruled from 1971 to 2000, he is adept at
playing off Iran and Arab states against
each other. The Syrian regime has no love
for Gulf rulers: Assad fils once called them
“half men” for their failure to support Hiz
bullah, the Lebanese Shia militia, during
its war against Israel in 2006. There is no
reason to trust that a pot of reconstruction
aid will persuade Mr Assad to toss out his
Iranian saviours, or that his corrupt, vi
cious dictatorship will be a force for stabil
ity in the Levant.
In decades past it would have been diffi
cult to imagine a Gulf state breaking so
publicly with its American protector. But
the uae, like several of its neighbours, has
grown exasperated with America. It is not
that the latter is leaving the region. Tens of
thousands of American troops are still de
ployed in Iraq, Syria and the Gulf. After an
Iranianbacked group fired missiles and
drones at Abu Dhabi in January, America
sent a squadron of f22 fighters and a guid
edmissile destroyer to the uae.Sorry, snoozy Uncle Sam
America is not absent, but it seems inco
herent. It wanted Mr Assad gone but al
lowed him to stay. Its Iran policy does an
aboutface every four years. President Joe
Biden vowed to make Saudi Arabia a “pari
ah”, until he needed its help to lower oil
prices; both the Saudi and Emirati crown
princes now duck his phone calls. The uae
feels little need to follow America’s line
when it seems so meandering.
Three days after his embrace with the
Syrian dictator, Prince Muhammad flew to
Sharm elSheikh to meet the Israeli and
Egyptian leaders, his first such tripartite
meeting. This surprise summit touched on
everything from food prices to Iran’s nuc
lear programme. All three participants are
close to America, yet all three have sharp
disagreements with it. Syria is a case in
point. AbdelFattah alSisi, Egypt’s presi
dent, restored ties with Mr Assad soon
after he took power in 2014. Many Israeli
security people opposed Mr Assad’s ouster,
fearing a failed state on their border. Amer
ica may complain about theirpositions on
Syria and other issues. ButitsArab allies
feel ever less need to listen.nD UBAI
Why Syria’s ruthless dictator, after years of isolation, took a holiday in the Gulf