The Economist April 16th 2022 Asia 35
They envisioned structures that floated ov
er the seas and reached for the skies. Kuro
kawa called his capsules “cyborg architec
ture”, where “man, machine and space
build a new organic body”.
The ideas were characteristic of an era
of change and possibility. “There was great
momentum in society,” says Maeda Tat
suyuki of Nakagin Capsule Tower Preserva
tion and Restoration Project. “It was a per
iod when society was bolder and could af
ford to do such things.”
By the end, the structure was decaying
and riddled with asbestos. Many of the
capsules were no longer habitable. The
tower’s destruction serves as a reminder of
the relative caution of contemporary Ja
pan. “These days, nobody would dare to
build anything like that,” Mr Maeda sighs.
Yet it is also reflective of the same culture
of impermanence that once inspired the
Metabolists. In Japan, buildings are tradi
tionally made of wood and paper, not in
tended to last centuries. There is not much
of a preservationist movement. “Japan
seems to demolish things before there’s
even debate,” says Mr Maeda.
Still, fans and residents of the Nakagin
tower had hoped to raise funds to replace
the capsules, in line with Kurokawa’s ini
tial concept. They had been in negotiations
about buying the building. But the pan
demic halted any momentum they had. Mr
Maeda’s group now hopes to rescue some
40 individual capsules, remove the asbes
tos, recreate the interiors and give them
new lives at museums around the world.
Mr Maeda compares the process to a “with
ered dandelion” spreading its seeds. “The
capsules will take on a life of theirown,
scattered across different locations.”It isin
keeping with the spirit of Metabolism.n
N
ow thatAustralia’s prime minister,
Scott Morrison, has set a date, May
21st, for a general election, expect his
beleaguered conservative coalition to
ramp up attacks on the Labor Party and
its supposed incompetence. On the
economy, it will paint Labor as a choker
of growth. On security, it will call it soft
on defence. In a particularly crass move,
Mr Morrison has called Anthony Alba
nese, Labor’s leader, Beijing’s candidate.
In truth, when it comes to Australia’s
security priorities, a bipartisan consen
sus prevails. Both the ruling Liberal
National coalition and Labor deem the
rise of an increasingly coercive China to
represent what defence planners gloomi
ly call the “most consequential strategic
realignment” in the region since the
second world war.
Defence spending has thus risen from
about A$30bn ($22bn) in 2015 to almost
A$50bn in this year’s budget, and will top
A$70bn by 2030, according to the Austra
lian Strategic Policy Institute, a think
tank in Canberra, the capital. In Septem
ber Australia, America and Britain
formed aukus, an arrangement for dip
lomatic and technological collaboration
on security, including a deal for at least
eight Australian nuclearpowered sub
marines. These are intended to help
thwart any Chinese bid for hegemony in
the AsiaPacific region.
Other proposals (some in the works
for a while) have come thick and fast
before the election, from an Australian
space agency to the development of
hypersonic missiles. Some A$10bn is
going on cyber and intelligence capabili
ties, and the procurement of new defen
sive missiles and sea mines has been
sped up. The 60,000strong armed forces
will grow by a third by 2040.
The opposition has gone along with
all of this. The bipartisan consensus is
striking. The question is whether it is
healthy. Some Australian strategists argue
not—that defence priorities and implica
tions are confused and even at odds. It is
far from clear how a war with China would
be fought, or where. A clarifying debate
about Australian defence is still needed.
Not since Japanese aggression in the
1940s has Australia been challenged by a
potentially hostile power. Today, should
the priority be defending Australia’s terri
torial boundaries and the approaches to
them, or should it be projecting power far
away? The nuclear subs and hypersonic
missiles embody the latter approach.
Sam Roggeveen of the Lowy Institute, a
thinktank in Sydney, argues that they risk
worsening Australia’s security overall,
because China will see them as provoca
tive. They also reflect “near panic” in the
defence establishment over the Chinese
threat to Australia. Beijing, Mr Roggeveen
notes, is closer to Berlin than to Sydney.
So to its critics, aukusreflects Amer
ican priorities in its struggle with China
more than it does Australian ones. No
doubt many of the priorities are shared.
Yet by the mid2050s, when (if all goes
well) the subs will be in service, “the
strategic contest between the United
States and China will be over,” claims
Hugh White of the Australian National
University—and not necessarily in
America’s favour.
The habit of thinking that America
will “fix our defence needs”, Mr White
says, “runs very deep in the Australian
psychology”. Yet Donald Trump’s “Amer
icafirst” sloganeering, in which he
disparaged alliances, suggested that
America’s longterm presence is hostage
to domestic ructions and can no longer
be taken for granted. Mr White argues for
much greater selfreliance in preparing
for the day when China can challenge
Australia in its own waters.
Yet whether on the home or away side
of the argument, a glaring hole exists in
Australia’s defence policy—a failure to
tend better to its nearabroad. News of a
Chinese security agreement with the
Solomon Islands has alarmed policymak
ers in Canberra. Mr Morrison has pro
tected Pacific islands’ aid budgets, as part
of his “Pacific stepup” campaign, in
tended to replace an episodic history of
diplomatic engagement with something
more consistent. But lowlying countries
are underwhelmed by his refusal to take
climate change seriously. And they re
sent his paternalistic talk of Australia’s
Pacific “family” and “backyard”.
As for Indonesia, security cooper
ation falls well short of its potential,
even though the giant archipelago to
Australia’s north could itself evolve into
a powerful buffer in its own right against
Chinese military ambitions. Whichever
side forms the next government would
do well to remember: the first line of
defence is better diplomacy.
A bipartisan consensus on Australian security masks the need for more debate
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