Introductionneuroscientist Giulio Tononi. On this view, consciousness depends upon a kind of information –
integrated information – which is understood via a quantifiable metric. In Chapter 11, Francis
Fallon and Andrew Brook examine Daniel Dennett’s Multiple Drafts Model (MDM), which
denies that consciousness involves an inner observer of a single linear stream of conscious-
ness (the “Cartesian Theater”). Instead, the brain composes multiple drafts of a narrative. David
Barrett (Chapter 12) critically discusses Jesse Prinz’s account of consciousness, which is called
the “Intermediate Level Theory of Consciousness.” It holds that consciousness arises when rep-
resentations at the intermediate level of processing are attended to. In Chapter 13, Michael S.
Graziano presents an overview of his own Attention Schema Theory of Consciousness, which
describes how an information-processing machine can be understood as being conscious of
something. In the theory, the brain is an information processor that is captive to the information
constructed within it.
Antti Revonsuo (Chapter 14) explains both John Searle’s Biological Naturalism (BN) and his
own Biological Realism (BR). They have in common the view that consciousness is the inner
presence of unified qualitative subjectivity, which constitutes a real biological phenomenon
happening in our brain at a higher level of neurophysiological organization. The strengths and
weaknesses of BN and BR are described and weighted. In Chapter 15, Erik Myin and Victor
Loughlin explain and defend the “sensorimotor approach” to consciousness, which holds that
perceptual experience is something we do, not something that happens in us. That is, having
perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of engaging with our environments in par-
ticular ways. Paavo Pylkkänen (Chapter 16) expounds on the idea that the holistic and non-
mechanical notion of physical reality implied by quantum theory could help us to find a place
for mind and consciousness in nature. He provides an introduction to some of the main theories
that have arisen from these explorations.
Each of the theories discussed in Part II is currently the subject of vigorous debate and
continued development. Most of them are in competition with others, but some could instead
serve to complement others.
Part III (“Major Topics in Consciousness Research”) contains chapters on many cutting-
edge, and even sometimes provocative, topics frequently encountered in contemporary work
on consciousness. Authors explore answers to such questions as: What are the candidates for
the neural correlates of consciousness? What is the precise relationship between consciousness
and attention? What can various disorders of consciousness tell us about normal consciousness?
Are animals, or at least most animals, conscious? Could a robot ever be conscious? Are dreams
conscious? What is the “unity of consciousness”? Are sensory experiences essentially conceptual
in nature? What is the relationship between consciousness and intentionality? How does time or
temporal experience manifest itself in conscious experience? What is special about multisensory
consciousness and the fascinating phenomenon of “synesthesia”? What is the role of conscious-
ness in action? Are emotions always conscious? What does meditation tell us about conscious-
ness? How can we know when a post-comatose patient is conscious and what ethical problems
arise in such cases?
In Chapter 17, Valerie Gray Hardcastle and Vicente Raja critically examine the quest for the
so-called “neural correlates of consciousness” (NCC) and explain why there is still no agreement
among scientists or philosophers regarding what the NCC might be. Wayne Wu (in Chapter 18)
explores the many different relations between attention and phenomenal consciousness, such
as if attention is necessary for consciousness, if attention is sufficient for it, whether attention
changes consciousness, and how attention might give us access to consciousness. In Chapter 19,
David Pitt explains that although mainstream analytic philosophy of mind has long held that
consciousness is not required for the intentionality of mental states, there has been increasing