Rocco J. Gennarorecent support for the idea that intentionality is essentially experiential. This chapter summarizes
the views and arguments for and against such a claim. Philippe Chuard (Chapter 20) asks: Does
sensory consciousness require conceptualization so that what one is sensorily aware of in con-
scious perception is partly a function of what one conceptually identifies? This chapter critically
reviews some of the central considerations advanced against this conceptualist doctrine. Ian
Phillips (Chapter 21) explores the notion that our capacity for conscious awareness of tem-
poral aspects of reality depends essentially on memory. He ultimately argues that the idea that
memory is involved in all temporal experience can be sustained across all plausible accounts of
temporal experience. In doing so, he critically engages with Dainton’s influential carving of the
landscape into three models of temporal experience, i.e. cinematic, retentional, and extensional.
In Chapter 22, Shaun Gallagher adduces evidence for the view that consciousness plays a sig-
nificant role before, during, and after action. This can also be seen as an argument against epi-
phenomenalism, which holds that consciousness does not have a causal impact on our behavior.
Demian Whiting (Chapter 23) focuses on the questions: “What exactly is meant by saying that
emotions are conscious and why does it matter?” and “Are emotions always conscious?”
In Chapter 24, Berit Brogaard and Elijah Chudnoff carefully distinguish between two kinds
of ordinary multisensory experience, explain the virtues of this distinction, and then examine
synesthesia, which is a more atypical multisensory experience. Rocco J. Gennaro (Chapter 25)
reviews the growing interdisciplinary field sometimes called “philosophical psychopathology,”
which is also related to so-called “philosophy of psychiatry” (covering the overlapping topics of
psychopathy and mental illness). The focus is on various psychopathologies with special atten-
tion to how they negatively impact conscious experience, such as amnesia, somatoparaphrenia,
schizophrenia, visual agnosia, autism, and dissociative identity disorder (DID). In Chapter 26,
Andrew Peterson and Tim Bayne review the use of neuroimaging and electroencephalographic
methods to assess covert consciousness in patients who are diagnosed as being in a vegetative or
minimally conscious state. They conclude with a discussion of the moral relevance of conscious-
ness in this patient group. Elizabeth Schechter (Chapter 27) points out how at any moment
in time, an experiencing subject’s perspective encompasses a multitude of elements: sights and
sounds, on the face of it, as well as thoughts, feelings, and so on. Thus, questions about the “unity
of consciousness” concern the relations between these elements and how to account for them.
Questions about conscious unity also concern the identity of experiencing subjects or “selves.”
In Chapter 28, Corey J. Maley and Gualtiero Piccinini critically examine the notion that phe-
nomenal consciousness might have evolved in one of three ways. If phenomenal consciousness
performs a function—that is, if it has physical effects that confer an adaptive advantage—it was
probably selected for. If phenomenal consciousness has no function, it is either a byproduct of
some other trait or a frozen evolutionary accident.
Sean Allen-Hermanson (Chapter 29) focuses on the questions: “Are animals conscious?” and
“If so, to what extent?” This chapter surveys some historical views on animal consciousness but
then includes significant discussion of recent inferential and non-inferential approaches as well
as neuro-reductive and representational theories. In Chapter 30, Jonathan Waskan considers
various answers to the following questions: “Can robots be made to have conscious experi-
ences?” “Will they ever see red or feel pain?” “How would we know?” “What moral obligations
would we have towards them?” “Could we create beings vastly more sophisticated than our-
selves, such as hyper-intelligent robots?” Jennifer M. Windt (Chapter 31) introduces a version
of the “simulation view” that defines dreaming through its immersive, here-and-now structure.
She focuses on minimal forms of dreaming, arguing that they coincide with minimal forms
of self-experience including bodily experiences. In Chapter 32, Jake H. Davis examines the
philosophical value of a proposal arising out of a specific Buddhist meditative practice: the