8.2 Entity Grounding
My plan for this section is to present an overview of Schaffer’s views, discuss the
status of ground as an entity in its own right, and then turn to the question of
whether ground as understood by Schaffer is dispensable. With respect to thefinal
question, I’ll argue that, given the metaphysical tools already in our possession, there
is no need for a metaphysically primitive grounding relation as understood by
Schaffer. One possibility is that talk of grounding can be replaced with talk of degrees
of being plus other interesting metaphysical relations.
According to Schaffer (2009), the fundamental task of metaphysics is not to
determine what kinds of things exist but rather to determine which kinds of things
are fundamental, and to determine how the remainder depends upon the fundamen-
tal. An entity isfundamentaljust in case nothing grounds it; an entity isderivative
just in case something grounds it.^11
On Schaffer’s (2009) view, the relation ofgroundingis asymmetric and transitive.^12
Schaffer (2009: 375–6) distinguishes relations of partial and total ground, but holds
that they are inter-definable:xis a partial ground ofyif and only ifxis among those
xs that are the total ground ofy;xs are a total ground ofyif and only if any partial
ground ofyis among thexs.^13 (The plural variables can take single objects, and hence
it is possible for a single object to be a total ground of another object.) In what
follows, by“ground”I intend“total ground,”unless I explicitly state otherwise.
According to Schaffer, grounding is an ideologically primitive relation. (We will
discuss shortly whether it is in some sense a metaphysically primitive relation.)
On Schaffer’s view, the questions of whether entities such as numbers, meanings,
wholes, or holes exist are uninteresting: they obviously do. Schaffer notes that there are
many true, affirmative propositions that imply the reality of such entities. (This should
ring a bell!) The interesting questions are whether these entities are fundamental entities
or derivative entities. As I indicated in sections 5.5 and 5.6, I am inclined to agree.
One of the metaphysical questions driving Schaffer is whether wholes are prior to
their parts. On Schaffer’s (2010)monisticview, the universe, which is the mereo-
logical sum of all concrete objects, is anintegrated whole, where the notion of an
integrated whole is defined by him as follows:
xis an integrated whole = df.xgrounds each ofx’sproper parts.We can contrast the notion of an integrated whole with that of a mere aggregate,
which is a whole that is grounded by its proper parts. In what follows, we will try to
(^11) Schaffer (2009: 373). Compare with Baumgarten (2014: 102). Note that, if we accept that some
entities are not even apt for being grounded, we might wish to revise the definition of fundamentality: an
entity isfundamentalif and only if it is apt for grounding and ungrounded. See Dasgupta (2015,
forthcoming) for this sort of view, and Schaffer (2009: 373, fn. 32) for an antecedent to it. 12
13 Schaffer (2012) abandons transitivity. See Javier-Castellanos (2014) for a critical response.
Compare with Baumgarten (2014: 105–7).