separate Schaffer’s views about grounding per se from his applications of that notion
in his metaphysical system. This won’t always be possible though; in general, it is a
mistake to divorce the assessment of questions about the nature of ground from the
assessment of other metaphysical questions.
To see why this is, let us turn to the question of whether we should think of
grounding as an entity.^14 From my perspective, this is not the best question to pose:
rather than ask whether grounding is an entity, i.e., an existent in our ontology, we
should ask what sort of mode of being grounding might possess. But for now set this
aside and focus on whether grounding is an entity.
If we accept Schaffer’s easy ontological ways, isn’t the answer“obviously yes”?
There are innumerably many true statements in which grounding is apparently
referred to—hence we should accept that there is a relation of grounding, unless
paradox threatens by our doing so.^15 From a Schafferian perspective, shouldn’twe
say that the interesting question is whether grounding itself is fundamental or
derivative, not whether grounding exists?^16
But we can’t answer this question without also entering into more general meta-
physical debates, because we need to know what sort of thing grounding is supposed
to be in order to assess whether grounding is grounded. Is grounding a universal? Are
universals necessarily instantiated? If a universal is instantiated in some thing or
things, is it grounded in those things? Or are universals and things always both
grounded infactsthat consist in things instantiating universals? What grounds facts
about grounding? If grounding is not a universal, does“ground”refer to a class of
grounding tropes, i.e., particular properties or relations? In general, are tropes
grounded in the objects that exemplify them? If tropes are not in general grounded
in the objects that exemplify them, should we expect there to be a kind of uniformity
to the grounds of grounding tropes?
It might be that all properties, whether universals or tropes, are grounded in some
substance or substances. If so, grounding is not metaphysically primitive 1. However,
on this view, no property or relation is metaphysically primitive 1. We should infer
then that there is a distinction between properties that we have not yet captured.
Recall that in section 7.3 I characterized perfectly natural properties and relations as
those properties and relations such that no other property or relation is more real
than them. This characterization allowed us to say that no property or relation is fully
real while still marking an important distinction between properties and relations.
Similarly, we should distinguish those properties and relations that are not grounded
(^14) Schaffer (2009: 373, fn. 32) raises this question.
(^15) Does it matter if all the apparently true statements in which grounding is apparently referred to are
statements that philosophers make? Shamik Dasgupta has suggested to me that philosophers’talk of
grounding is really just a regimentation of an ordinary sense of“because”in natural language. If the
ordinary folk trade in talk of grounding, the case for the existence of such a relation appears stronger, but is
it a weak case if they do not? 16
Recall the discussion of easy ontology in section 5.6.