Leaders 9T
he mightofthemodernRussian armywassupposedto
show the world that President Vladimir Putin had restored
his country to greatness after the humiliation of the Soviet col
lapse. Instead, poor progress and heavy losses in Ukraine have
exposed deep flaws within Russia. For those threatened by Mr
Putin’s aggression, a diminished army is a relief. Unfortunately,
it also leaves a nucleararmed power with a point to prove.
So far, the invasion of Ukraine has been a disaster for Russia’s
armed forces. About 15,000 troops have been killed in two
months of fighting, according to Britain’s government. At least
1,600 armoured vehicles have been destroyed, along with doz
ens of aircraft and the flagship of the Black Sea fleet. The assault
on the capital, Kyiv, was a chaotic failure.
Leon Trotsky wrote that “the army is a copy of society and suf
fers from all its diseases, usually at a higher temperature”. Fight
ing in the east and the south of Ukraine over the next few weeks
will not only determine the course of the war, but it will also de
termine how much the Russian army can salvage its reputa
tion—and the reputation of the society it embodies.
Our briefing this week sets out just how rotten the army has
been. Russia’s defence budget, of over $250bn at purchasing
power, is about three times that of Britain or France, but much of
it is squandered or stolen. Mr Putin and his top commanders
kept their invasion plans from senior officers,
reflecting a crippling lack of trust. Disaffected
troops, fed on outofdate rations, have desert
ed their vehicles. Units have tortured, raped
and murdered only to be honoured by the
Kremlin. Russia has failed to win control of the
skies or combine air power with tanks, artillery
and infantry. Wallowing in corruption, unable
to foster initiative or learn from their mistakes,
its frustrated generals abandoned advanced military doctrine
and fell back on flattening cities and terrorising civilians.
Ukraine’s highly motivated forces are a rebuke to these Rus
sian failings. Despite being less numerous and less well armed,
they resisted the invading army by passing decisionmaking to
small, adaptable local units given uptotheminute intelli
gence. Even if the Russian campaign, now under a single com
mander, makes gains in Donbas, it will do so chiefly thanks to its
sheer mass. Its claim to be a sophisticated modern force is as
convincing as a tank turret rusting in a Ukrainian field.
For Mr Putin this is a crushing setback. That is partly because,
although he controls a formidable propaganda machine to help
drown out his critics, the loss of face threatens his standing at
home. It is mostly because the use of military force is central to
his strategy for making Russia count in the world.
Russia may be vast, but it is a mediumsized polity that still
yearns to be a superpower. Its population ranks between Bangla
desh and Mexico, its economy between Brazil and South Korea
and its share of global exports between Taiwan and Switzerland.
Although Russia enjoys some sympathy in nonaligned coun
tries like South Africa and India, its soft power is ebbing—has
tened by its display of incompetence and brutality in Ukraine.
To fill the gap between its power and aspirations—and to re
sistwhatheseesasAmerica’sencroachment—MrPutin has re
peatedly turned to the only sphere where Russia can still purport
to be worldclass: military force. In the past 14 years he has in
vaded Georgia and Ukraine (twice) and fought in Syria. His mer
cenaries have deployed to Libya, the Central African Republic,
Sudan and now Ukraine. Mr Putin is a global bully obsessed with
his country’s inadequacies. Contrast that with China, which also
has ambitions, but has so far been able to get results using its
growing economic and diplomatic heft.
Humiliation in Ukraine weakens Russia’s last claim to super
power status. The war may yet drag on, and while it does Russia
will not be able to mount big operations elsewhere. Equipment,
ammunition and manpower are being used up fast. Restoring
Russia’s forces to full strength and training them to avoid the
mistakes in Ukraine could take years. Should sanctions remain
because Mr Putin is still in power, the task will require even lon
ger. Russian missiles are chockfull of Western components.
The flight of talented, outwardlooking Russians will weigh on
the economy. All the while, the less that Russia can project mil
itary power, the less it will be able to disrupt the rest of the world.
That will be welcome. Yet, the invasion of Ukraine also holds
lessons that are less comforting. For one thing, it shows that in
pursuit of this strategy Mr Putin is willing to take risks that to
many others—including many Russians—
make no sense. Further decline in Russian pow
er could lead to still more reckless aggression.
Ukraine also shows that in future wars if
Russian forces cannot prevail on the battlefield,
they will resort to atrocities. A weaker Russian
army could be an even more brutal one. For
those around the world facing Russian aggres
sion, that is a terrible prospect.
Ultimately, weakness may lead Russia to the last arena where
it is still indisputably a superpower: chemical, biological and
nuclear weapons. From the start of this war, Mr Putin and his
government have repeatedly brandished the threat of weapons
of mass destruction. Mr Putin is rational, in that he wants his re
gime to survive, so the chances of their use probably remain
slim. But as Russia’s armed forces run out of conventional op
tions, the temptation to escalate will surely grow.
The message for the wider world is that Mr Putin’s military
opportunism in Ukraine must be seen to fail by his own officers
and strategists, who may then temper his next headstrong
scheme. A stalemate in Donbas would merely set up the next
fight and it could be even more threatening than today’s.
Yet, even if Mr Putin is defeated, he will remain dangerous.
The message for nato is that it needs to update its tripwire de
fence. This rests on the idea that a Russian attempt to take a bite
out of, say, the Baltic states may succeed at first, but would trig
ger a wider war which nato would eventually win. That defence
involves the risk of miscalculation and escalation, which are
more fraught than ever if Russia’s conventional forces are weak.
Better to have a large forward force that Russia would find hard
to defeat from the very start. The best way to be safe fromMrPu
tin and his rotten army is to deter him from fighting at all.nVladimir Putin uses warfare to make up for Russia’s weaknesses. That is why he is so dangerousHow rotten is Russia’s army?