Migration scenarios: turkey, egypt and Morocco 269
This, in turn, causes an increase in the informal sector, which must absorb
more workers because of the high competitive pressure being exerted.
The structural crisis of agriculture also releases many workers, causing an
overall rise in the unemployed and an accelerated fall in the labour-force
participation rate – in our model from 49.5 per cent to a low of 44.2 per
cent in 2025.
It is our assumption that these effects of economic liberalisation will
ensue very quickly and, from 2010 on, simultaneously. Should reforms in
the educational sector fail to be enacted, the mismatch between training
and the job market would continue. Only in the year 2020 – following a
long period of growth with a high level of formal unemployment – would
there be any increase in the number of jobs available stemming from the
increase in production facilities and general growth in the service industry.
This is ref lected not only in a long-term growth of GDP and GNI, but also
in a rapid increase in the number of persons employed. The labour-force
participation rate lies at 47.5 per cent in 2030.
This scenario clearly shows that lingering employment problems, despite
positive economic development, lead to an increase in migration potential
beyond that expected for demographic reasons. This is due to the fact that
Egypt has a relatively low GDP compared to the EU to start with. As a
consequence, it will take Egypt a long time to catch up with the EU, even
if Egypt has a high level of growth and if we project only a moderate level
of growth of 1 per cent in the EU. After twenty years at triple (!) the original
GDP, Egypt will succeed in closing the gap by only about 18 per cent – and
its GDP will still hover at about 50 per cent of that of the EU. It should come
as no surprise that, in light of the employment statistics, this development
does not serve to effectively reduce the emigration potential. Only in the
year 2030, according to this scenario, would the emigration potential fall
slightly below its demographic rate, always, of course, under the assumption
of free movement between Egypt and the EU.
Reforms stagnate, political conf licts continue and the economy slumps
(scenario 2)
This second scenario presumes a long-lasting economic stagnation
stemming from the political crisis. This continues through to 2020 and
results in only minimal growth or even recession. From 2014 onwards,
the oil reserves are on the downturn, and market liberalisation is stopped
because of the regime change and the resulting domestic turbulences.
The consequences are, f irst, the stagnation and, later, the shrinking, of
foreign investments.