280 Michael BoMMes, siMon FellMer and Friederike ZigMann
investment projects. Similar rates are also assumed for the GNI. In this
scenario, however, the labour-force participation rate changes little, in the
absence of radical changes in the economic or political structures, leading
to a very modest 0.1 per cent increase due to the positive impulses coming
from the textile industry and foreign investments. The emigration potential
thus remains high – and, in fact, increases over time because of the low
baseline level and massive differential with respect to the EU.
Decrease in tourism and the textile sector, and collapse of the price of
phosphate (scenario 2)
Far more negative developments are conceivable. A massive terror attack
could damage tourism for many years to come. The textile industry could
also lose a considerable share of its market to China. In such a scenario,
GDP is presumed to increase at a rate of 0.5 per cent up to 2019 but, from
2020 on, growth stops altogether and, after 2025, the economy even shrinks
because of the worldwide decline in phosphate prices.
In order to fulf il its obligations, Morocco would have to raise taxes at
the latest in 2020, leaving its citizens with less GNI to live on (a one-time
reduction in 2020 by 4 per cent and thereafter, from 2025, a decrease by 2
per cent per annum because of the negative development of GDP). By 2026
at the latest, all these developments would hit the job market. Because
the Moroccan government is not in a position to raise its investments in
education or to carry out sustainable reforms, the labour-force participation
rate would fall yearly by 2 percentage points, beginning in 2027.
The assumptions made above do not seem to be unrealistic nor overly
negative in their prognosis about future developments. Rather, they clearly
point out that only reforms within a country can, indeed, lead to permanent
improvements. The ‘misfortunes’ to be borne by Morocco are, for the most
part, beyond the reach of political will (terrorism, development of interna-
tional commodity prices, rise of China). Yet deep reforms in the education
and social systems, as well as a campaign against corruption, would open up
new directions for an otherwise mediocre economic situation, for example,
by attracting new foreign investments. In the above scenario, however, the
results would be very different: The potential 974,537 emigrants by 2030
would represent a greater risk to Moroccan society than to the EU. One
might assume that, among this number, a great many highly qualif ied
persons would leave the country, since the job market in Morocco does not
offer this group adequate prospects.