284 Michael BoMMes, siMon FellMer and Friederike ZigMann
Turkey as a model: Foreign investments and economic liberalisation
(scenario 3)
In this f inal scenario the – relatively speaking – positive economic de-
velopment found in Turkey serves as the model for Morocco’s future. The
country succeeds in effectively f ighting corruption. As a consequence, it
will become attractive to foreign investors (also because of the low wage
levels and the relatively high number of well-trained workers available).
Scenario 3 assumes an annual rise in GDP of 5 per cent, a similar rate for GNI
and an increasing labour-force participation rate, albeit only by a modest
0.5 per cent. From 2013 on, the country will utilise its budget situation to
invest in the educational infrastructure. Because of its well-educated pool
of available workers, it will be in a position to remain attractive to investors
and to secure foreign capital. The result is a veritable boom in subsequent
years – after 2017, growth increases by 7.5 per cent, even 8 per cent by 2028.
The labour-force participation rate rises only slightly (0.3 per cent) but, by
2030, has reached a relatively high level of 53 per cent. Only the GNI fails
to keep up because of the moderate wage increases, and grows by only 3
per cent in the years up to 2026 and by 4 per cent in the years thereafter.
This optimistic scenario 3 highlights one important factor – even GDP
growth rates of up to 8 per cent and GNI rates of 4 per cent, and an increase
in the labour-force participation rate leading to convergence with the EU,
cannot stop Morocco from remaining an emigration country. The economic
gap becomes smaller, to be sure, but it is still large enough to trigger poten-
tial emigration among the population.
9.6 Conclusion
Empirically speaking, the nine scenarios presented here highlight the ex-
treme importance of demographics. Demographic development remains the
decisive factor in determining the emigration potential of these countries.
A realistic projection of the economic development does inf luence the
amount of emigration potential, but it cannot signif icantly change it. Only
if we assume very large rates of growth in the MENA states do we get an
emigration potential that markedly deviates from that determined in the
demographic calculations. Scenario 1 for Turkey, for example, foresees an
emigration potential of only 100,000 people by 2030 – but it was based on
a tripling of GDP over this time period!
That demographics is of such major signif icance is also due to the large
gap with the EU, as measured by per capita GDP. Even if we assume only very