30 INDIA TODAY AUGUST 13, 2018
OVER STORY
INDIA-PAKISTAN TIES
good as dead, after repeated violations—
indeed in September 2016 India famously
resorted to surgical strikes to warn Paki-
stan to end cross-border terrorism after a
series of provocative terror attacks.
Khan takes charge at a critical time
when his troubled country is at a major
crossroads not only in terms of its volatile
internal dynamics but also in its relations
with other countries, particularly India.
In his victory speech, Khan complained
that India had portrayed him as a Bol-
lywood villain. He should have known
better about a country that loves cricket
as much as his own does. In India, Khan
remains a cricketing hero and his 1992
World Cup win was regarded not just as
a Pakistani victory but a subcontinen-
tal one. As Khan takes over as the po-
litical captain of Pakistan on August 11,
he should remember that there is inher-
ent goodwill for him in the hearts of the
Indian public. And he should not fritter
that away.
That the Pakistan army had sup-
ported his political ascent to displace a
belligerent Sharif is now common knowl-
edge. But as Shivshankar Menon, former
national security advisor and an expert
on Pakistan, points out, “Everyone may
have written off Khan as a stooge of the
army, but once a politician comes to pow-
er, the dynamics of the post and not the
individual determine his relations with
the establishment. He will follow his own
dharma just as the army chief does.” Ex-
perts give Khan six months in the job be-
fore he exhibits traits of independence and
assertiveness that characterised even his
cricketing captaincy. The larger-than-life
sense of self that he developed both as a
cricketing and social icon has made him
even more imperial and headstrong in his
behaviour than most of his predecessors.
Almost all Indian leaders have found
Pakistan far more complex and compli-
cated to deal with than any other country.
That’s because there are several Pakistans
to deal with simultaneously. Imran Khan
as prime minister represents an important
face of Pakistan, but is only one of them.
There is also the powerful Pakistan army
that will seek to strengthen its hold over
foreign policy and internal security. Then
there are the Islamic right-wing groups,
including militants, who with the bless-
ings of the army had tried to join the
political mainstream by contesting elec-
tions—though without much success. And
then there is its burgeoning civil society
which wants Pakistan to develop rapidly
and provide jobs for its aspiring young.
Khan represents a puzzling duality.
He has maintained his comfort with mo-
dernity even as he embraced the support
of right-wing conservatives to further his
political prospects as he did with the army.
T.C.A. Raghavan, a former high commis-
sioner to Pakistan, points out, “Let’s be
clear that Imran is not a 100 per cent crea-
ture of the army—he is his own leader. He
may have more of a comfort zone with the
army than his predecessors did—this is
not a bad thing for us.” In fact, India might
find dealing with Khan far easier than
Sharif because at least when he says he
will do something, he will have the back-
ing of the army. So the duality that India
has experienced while dealing with other
Pakistani leaders may not be as strong.Sharif, for example, had an open confron-
tation with the army, which then worked
towards his ouster. Khan has seen the fate
of politicians in Pakistan who have tried
to take on the army chief and is likely to be
more circumspect.
Yet experienced Pakistan-watchers
believe that a change in top civilian lead-
ership in Islamabad need not result in a
change in the status quo in its relations
with India. That’s because, as Sharat Sab-
harwal, another former high commission-
er to Pakistan, says, “The army remains a
constant, and with Sharif’s exit, there is
further dampening of relations with In-
dia.” Sabharwal is not comforted by the
PTI manifesto, particularly the foreign
policy objectives it lays down. On Kashmir,
the manifesto expectedly declares it as a
core issue, but harks back to the rhetoric
of the distant past, calling for resolving the
dispute within the parameters of UN Se-
curity Council resolutions. Both countries
had long since moved on from this point
and any reference to it is seen as a stalling
mechanism by Pakistan.
More worrying for Sabharwal is that,
in the manifesto, Khan sees “conflict reso-
lution and the security route to cooperation
as the most viable” to sort out issues with
India. Translated, this means that Khan’s
government will up the ante on conflict
resolution, with no mention of improving
relations on other fronts, including trade—
which is exactly the Pakistan army’s stand.
Though Khan, in his victory speech, did
mention improving trade relations with
India, this is being seen as something of
an afterthought rather than a carefully
crafted policy. Moreover, Khan will be too
preoccupied with the pressing task of stop-India will
probably find it
easier to deal
with Khan as
his moves are
likely to have
the army’s
backingLET BYGONES BE Imran Khan meets Prime
Minister Modi in Delhi in December 2015