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“oftenactedunwittinglyto undermine” the freeenterprisesystemthat“he admired...
Thushe... proclaimedthatlaissez-faireis not ‘a ruleof science,’ but a matterof mere
expediency;and endedas a skeptic,holdingthatthereare no moralobjectivestandards,
and that ‘an absolutephilosophyof truthand right... is a delusion.’”^117
Sumner,quiteexpectedly,is far fromalonein takinglargephilosophicmissteps.His
mentor,HerbertSpencer,has also subscribedto somedebilitatingfallacies.
TheUnfitAspectsof Spencer’s Theories
GiventhatSpencer,unlikeSumner,recognizedlaissez-fairerightsto privateproperty
as objectivemoralabsolutes,it mayinitiallyappearparadoxicalthathe wasgreatlyad-
miredby the followingfamousfigures,evenaftertheyhadfirmlypledgedallegianceto
socialism:^118 JackLondon,^119 BeatriceWebb,^120 AlfredRusselWallace,^121 andthe anti-
eugenicsbiologistnamedfor him,HerbertSpencerJennings.Spenceradditionallyre-
ceivedaccoladesfromcelebritieswhodid not appreciatebeingcalledsocialistsbut who
neverthelessagitatedfor progressivegovernistmeasuresthatSpencerneverwouldhave
supported—attorney Clarence Darrow^122 and multimillionaire industrialist Andrew
Carnegie.
The reasonfor this stemsfromSpencer’s unwiseconcessionsto his socialistadversar-
ies. The mostegregiousof thesewashis concessionthat the moralidealfor societywould
be for the individualto subordinatehis owninterestsentirelyto the well-beingof the
socialcollective.Thatis a concessionto the moraldoctrinesof altruismwhenone speaks
the wordas Spencer’s contemporary—Frenchphilosopher-sociologistAugusteComte—
definedit. And,although—as we discoveredin BookTwo—Spencerplayeda largerole in
tryingto redefinealtruismas merelyany person’s beneficencetowardothers,the subordi-
nationof self to non-selfin priorityremainspresentin Spencer’s homiliesaboutaltruism.
Spencerbelievesthat we modernhumanbeingstendto pursueour ownfinancialgain,
andthatthis is perfectlyfineandmoralwhenone doesso in the absenceof spoliation.
Thatis righton, as far as it goes.UnfortunatelySpencerveersoff-courseby thendeclaring
thatthoughsuchan ethicalstanceis fine for the presentage,it is still morallyprimitive.
The morehumancivilizationadvancesandevolves,the moremorallysophisticatedour
civilizationwill become.To Spencer,this morehighlyevolvedmoralitywill not entailthe
greateramountof individualismand individualfreedomthatAynRandwouldassociate
withmoralprogress,but a greaterpreponderanceof the socialcollectivismfor which
nineteenth-centurysocialistsclamored.Muchas NoamChomskyand otherfar-Leftanti-
corporationactivistswould,Spencerenvisionsthe perfectlyvirtuoussocietyas one that is
bothanarchisticand collectivist.
Spencerconstructsan absurdlyself-contradictoryargumentby claimingthatin his
futurealtruist-collectivistanarchistarcadia,the sacrificeof a man’s ownself-interestsfor
the socialcollectivewill createso muchhappinessfor himthat to sacrificehimselfwill be
in his ownself-interest.Thiswouldespeciallyapplyas everyonewillalreadybe so rich,
andhavesuchhighlivingstandards,thatonewillseldomfindan the opportunityto
reducehis ownlivingstandardfor anyoneelse’s benefit.Hence,“therewilldisappear
thatapparentlypermanentoppositionbetweenegoismandaltruism... Subjectively
lookedat, the conciliationwillbe suchthatthe individualwillnot haveto balancebe-
tweenself-regardingimpulsesand other-regardingimpulses;but,instead,thosesatisfac-
tionsof other-regardingimpulseswhichinvolveself-sacrifice,becomingrareandmuch
prized,will be so unhesitatinglypreferredthat the competitionof self-regardingimpulses
withthemwillscarcelybe felt.Andthe subjectiveconciliationwillalsobe suchthat
thoughaltruisticpleasurewill be attained,yet the motiveof actionwill not consciouslybe
the attainmentof altruisticpleasure;but the ideapresentwillbe the securingof others’