300 } Notes to Chapter 2
- Ibid., 1 : 88.
- Friedrich Schleiermacher, Der christliche Glaube 1821 / 22 , 1 : 31.
- Ibid., 1 : 89. The passage also appears in Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der
Religion, edited by Jaeschke, 3 : 7 – 8. - The following passage appears only some fifteen pages into “The Concept of Re-
ligion,” and Gans and his associates would presumably have heard it before the meeting at
which Gans proposed the term Wissenschaft des Judentums. - Hegel, LPR 1 : 200. I have interpellated in curly brackets additional and alternative
passages from the second ( 1840 ) edition of Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Re-
ligion, edited by Philipp Marheineke and Bruno Bauer, whereas these passages are given
in footnotes in Hodgson’s edition. The 1840 edition of Hegel’s Werke draws extensively in
its reconstruction of the 1821 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion on a transcript by Leo-
pold von Henning, which has been lost. The only portions of it that have come down to us
are those the editors wove together with passages from Hegel’s 1821 manuscript in the 1840
edition. Since Marheineke and Bauer may also have drawn on other miscellaneous papers
by Hegel to embellish the 1821 manuscript, it is not possible to say with certainty which
additions to the manuscript in the 1840 text derive from Henning’s transcript and which
are, potentially, from Hegel’s related papers. According to Hodgson, however, very little of
Hegel’s miscellaneous papers relate to the 1821 manuscript, and the vast majority of the ma-
terial that the 1840 edition adds to that manuscript undoubtedly derives from Henning’s
1821 transcript—and thus would have been heard by members of the Verein in that year. See
Hodgson, “Editorial Introduction,” 1 : 15 and 49. - Hegel, LPR 1 : 187 , note 8.
- Ibid., 1 : 191 – 92. The corresponding passage in the 1840 edition (see note 135 ) in-
cludes this formulation: “If the substantial element remains only shut up within the heart, it
is not recognized as something higher, and God is only something subjective. The orienta-
tion afforded by subjectivity remains at best a drawing of lines into empty space” (quoted in
ibid., 1 : 192 , note 20 ). For this passage in German, see Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie
der Religion, edited by Jaeschke, 1 : 100 – 101. - Hegel’s attack on subjectivism as a politically corrosive force in the philosophy of
religion lectures continues similar arguments in Philosophy of Right, which, as Dickey notes,
admonish Protestants to overcome the narrow subjectivism of forms of Protestantism con-
ceived according to feeling and private faith, in order to realize secularized Protestantism’s
social and ethical potential: “In [the Preface to Philosophy of Right], he continues his as-
sault of subjectivism by reiterating the need to shift the focus of philosophy from feeling
to thinking. In so doing, however, he adds a religious dimension to the discussion, arguing
that, in Protestantism, feeling stands to thinking as an immature Lutheran attitude towards
religion stands to a mature Hegelian one. As the Preface reveals, Hegel uses the progression
from feeling to thinking to exhort Protestants to turn their inner-directed piety outwards—
towards Sittlichkeit and civic engagement” (“General Introduction,” xxiv). - Hegel, LPR, 1 : 208.
- See ibid., 1 : 214 – 16.
- Ibid., 1 : 215.
- Ibid., 1 : 216.
- On religion as representational thought, see ibid., 1 : 218 – 19. Hegel clearly directs his