Even today, though, India remains worried about the quality of supplies deliv-
ered by the Russian military–industrial complex.^19
The post–Cold War interruption of the supply of defense goods and technol-
ogies from the former Soviet Union redoubled New Delhi’s determination to
attain self-reliance in areas critical to national security. However, this focus on
indigenization, which now represents the core of the IN’s modernization
program, has the potential to cut both ways. Over a number of years, on the
one hand, it could make India largely independent of other great powers for
major combat systems, spares, and service for its equipment. On the other, the
Indian defense industry’s history of delivering quality military platforms in a
timely manner has been spotty.^20 Despite brave talk, the Indian government
appears to have realized that DRDO needs reorganization and closer oversight
if it is to spearhead the drive for indigenous weapons development and produc-
tion in the future.^21Sea-Based Deterrence
It was a good assumption, even as far back as the May 1998 nuclear tests,
that the sea-based deterrence role mentioned in the 1998 document was
primarily a nuclear one. Since the nuclear tests in 1998 and New Delhi’s open
declaration of its nuclear-weapons status, there has been open discussion about
the size, shape, and basing of India’s nuclear deterrent force. The Draft Report
of the National Security Advisory Board on Nuclear Doctrine, eventually
adopted by the Indian government as a broad outline for India’s nuclear
doctrine, is not explicit about platforms and systems, but it does contain param-
eters that seem to point to a sea-based leg for Indian nuclear forces. These
parameters include a no-first-use declaration and the concomitant requirement
for secure, survivable retaliatory forces.^22 Since the Draft Report was promul-
gated and ultimately adopted by theIndian government, there has been
relatively little public discussion of the specifics of how or when India will go
about acquiring such a capability.
Over time, however, information has begun to trickle out. The most authori-
tative indication that India will pursue a sea-based nuclear capability to date is
the 2005 annual report of the Defence Ministry, which indicates that India needs
a mix of air, land, and maritime capabilities in the nuclear realm.^23 The IN itself
is less shy about what it would like and the reason it believes this is necessary. In
the 2004 Maritime Doctrine document, service leaders are very explicit about
their view of the need for a submarine-based nuclear deterrent force: it ‘‘has
become an unstated axiom of the post Cold War era that an independent foreign
policy posture is inexorably linked with this [a submarine-based] deterrent
capability.’’ The document notes that all of the great powers have such a capabil-
ity: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, China, and France.^24136 Asia Looks Seaward