Again, this is more a political than an operational issue. But it does portend
some difficulties India could face if it decides to conduct sea-control or sea-
denial operations in waters that convey energy supplies to India and indeed to
users throughout Asia. The United States and India have been conducting
increasingly sophisticated naval exercises—the ‘‘Malabar series’’—since the
mid-1990s. However, multilateral operations under the aegis of CTF 150 are
different. They provide participants highly useful experience in operating with
multiple sets of rules of engagement, multiple communications capabilities,
and multiple operating concepts. It is difficult to envision circumstances in which
the flow of Persian Gulf oil and gas cameunder threat and the United States,
Europe, Australia, and Japan stood aside. If India also wants the option of joining
a combined maritime security effort, it is losing a valuable training opportunity
by remaining aloof from CTF 150.
The reasons behind Indian standoffishness are unclear. They may arise from
the U.S. military’s bureaucratic divide, which assigns India to the U.S. Pacific
Command’s area of responsibility and CTF 150 operations to the U.S. Central
Command. India understands this issue and is pursuing other opportunities for
combined exercises, testing the navy’s ability to work with fellow advanced navies
to assure free passage through the sea lanes of communication.^42 Regardless,
future Indian maritime security operations will likely be multilateral in nature
and will almost certainly involve the U.S., Japanese, and European navies.Naval Diplomacy
The IN has been conducting naval diplomacy almost since its inception.
For the most part, naval diplomacy requires no specific capabilities. Instead it
requires resources adequate to support highly visible operations, along with the
political will and vision to use naval assets to support broad foreign and security
policy objectives. Its diplomatic efforts were expansive during the 1980s,
supporting New Delhi’s assertive foreign policy, but they tapered off in the early
1990s. Since that low point, the IN has again stepped up its exercises with other
navies, port calls, operations designed to project a positive image of India, and
activities such as the circumnavigation voyage of the INSTarangini.The aircraft
carrierViraatvisited ports in Southeast Asia for the first time, signaling Indian
interest in the region while showing off a capability not possessed by China,
the other great power vying for influence in that subregion.^43
The most recent example of Indian naval diplomacy was Operation Sukoon,
which dispatched IN ships to Lebanon to help evacuate Indian, Nepalese,
Sri Lankan, and Lebanese nationals. This NEO showcased the IN’s increasing
capability to operate at significant distances from Indian coasts and to under-
take the types of naval-diplomatic operations formerly beyond its capacity
(and within the capacity of very few navies). The IN is acquiring capabilities that142 Asia Looks Seaward