will further enhance its ability to conduct such operations. Most recently, the
U.S. government agreed to sell India the retired amphibious transport USS
Tr e n t o n .Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee has tied theTr e n t o nacquisition
directly to naval diplomacy: ‘‘The ship would provide the Indian Navy enhanced
amphibious capability. In addition, the LPD (landing platform dock) can be
deployed for disaster relief operations.’’^44
Tsunami relief supplied another recent example of Indian naval diplomacy.
Indian naval leaders are rightfully proud of their service’s performance off Indo-
nesia, and they call for continuing and expanding such endeavors. The operation
represented the largest peacetime mission ever undertaken by the IN, involving
thirty-two ships, thirty aircraft, and over 5,500 personnel.^45 The Indian contin-
gent helped locate survivors, evacuate victims, remove salvage and debris,
conduct hydrographic surveys prior to reopening ports and harbors, and restore
drinking-water and power-generation facilities. These activities supported the
governments and residents of Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Indonesia, as well as
those Indian citizens of the Andaman and Nicobar islands who were also affected
by the tsunami.
Indian naval diplomacy—in the form of deployments and bilateral exercises—
has focused both on navies from states adjacent to key Indian Ocean SLOCs and
on navies with the ability to operate in or influence maritime affairs in the Indian
Ocean. Over the past year, India deployed its aircraft carrier for exercises with
U.S. and French carriers, demonstrating a capability within the reach of only a
handful of countries. It also conducted bilateral patrols of the Strait of Malacca
in conjunction with the Royal Thai Navy and the Indonesian Navy. (Washington
proposed combined patrols of this crucial waterway several years ago. Nearby
states turned down the U.S. proposal, deeming it too politically sensitive.) India
also set up a joint military cooperation committee with Oman that will lay the
groundwork for more extensive military, and particularly maritime, ties.^46 The
combination of India’s standing in the region, its maritime capabilities, and its
renewed willingness to dedicate naval assets to diplomatic initiatives allowed it
to make inroads that may make more ambitious operations possible in the future.
Forward PresenceForward presence is more difficult to define than the three functions discussed
above. It is at times difficult to distinguish between forward presence and naval
diplomacy. Measuring forward presence is also more problematic, in part because
some of the activities undertaken by a navy under the rubric of forward presence
may be invisible to the public eye. The ostensible purposes of forward presence
are to demonstrate interest in a specific area; demonstrate the ability to deploy
and operate in that area, reassuring nearby friends and allies; familiarize forces
with the operating environment there; and deter or dissuade potentially hostile
India as a Maritime Power? 143