powers from operating in that area. In today’s security parlance, forward presence
is a necessary part of ‘‘shaping’’ the international environment in line with the
state’s interests. India takes a keen interest in shaping the Indian Ocean region
and understands that military forces offer a useful tool for this effort.
In the case of the United States, forward presence has often been used to help
justify a large U.S. Navy force structure. Some analysts have argued that the
forward-presence mission imposes an undue burden on U.S. forces, driving
force-structure decisions and operating tempo to the detriment of other missions
and more sensible resource allocations.^47 This is not yet a concern for the IN.
In fact, naval leaders may find that adopting an ambitious forward-presence
mission may help the service in its budgetary battles with the army and air force.
For such a bureaucratic strategy to work, however, the IN must develop a specific
plan for forward presence, clearly distinguish forward presence from the navy’s
other roles, and connect it to force-structure and operational requirements. Some
officials have linked the presence mission to counter-piracy efforts and general
protection of the sea lanes, but this may prove a thin reed on which to hang
significant force-structure requirements. A more robust argument may be the
imperative to counter growing Chinese naval power and presence in the Indian
Ocean region, and particularly in Southeast Asia.^48Conclusions
India’s thinking about the place and utility of maritime power ranges through-
out Mohan’s three concentric circles. The farther India reaches out, however, the
moreproblematicitwillbecomefortheINtorealizesustainablecapabilities,
whether power projection or nuclear deterrence is at issue. This may be difficult
to accept for realist strategic thinkers who want their nation to play on the world
stage. To the degree that realist-minded leaders persuade New Delhi to deepen
relations with the United States, India will need high-end maritime capabilities
and the willingness to deploy these capabilities beyond the Indian Ocean region.
Otherwise, the Indo-U.S. relationship will remain unbalanced. India’s maritime
capabilities are growing within Mohan’s two inner circles and will—over
time—come to satisfy the grand-strategic ambitions of all of India’s schools of
strategic thought. As noted previously, however, unintended consequences could
accrue from potent Indian sea power.
Charles de Gaulle’s quip about Brazil—that it is, and will always be, a country
of the future—no longer applies to today’s nautically minded India. The IN
has performed admirably since its birth given stark political, financial, and tech-
nological realities. While the IN continues to suffer from the budgetary woes of
the 1980s and early 1990s, the quality and number of its platforms and associated
capabilities are on the upswing. The navy operates with mounting confidence in a
political environment, both domestic and international, that provides it far144 Asia Looks Seaward