General Aviation News - 21 June 2018

(Martin Jones) #1
June 21, 2018 http://www.GeneralAviationNews.com — facebook.com/ganews 25

Presidential TFRs are complicated.
These flight restrictions are temporary
and, often, the boundaries keep mov-
ing. Furthermore, they can occur without
warning anytime a president decides to
travel. They are kind of like pop-up sum-
mer thunderstorms.
They’re avoidable, but a pilot some-
times has to use every available resource
to avoid them.
A search of NASA’s Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS) found that 54
pilots and controllers submitted NASA
reports related to Presidential TFR en-
counters.
A Cessna 414 pilot filed a report after he
failed to see Presidential TFR boundary
markings on his ForeFlight Mobile app.
He was on a VFR flight to Santa Monica
Airport (KSMO). About 50 miles from
the airport, and in a descent, he tuned
in the ATIS and contacted SOCAL Ap-
proach for a flight following request. ATC
answered with a request to ident but made
no further contact for several minutes.
“The controller finally got back to me,”
wrote the pilot. “Asked me if I knew
about the TFR, and I replied ‘no,’ so he
vectored me to 240 (heading).”
He immediately complied. A few min-
utes later an F-15 fighter jet showed up
off his wing. In his report the pilot blamed
the incursion on two things: ATC and an
opacity setting in the ForeFlight app.
After the incident, he realized the opac-
ity setting on the mobile device he was
using had been put on the lowest setting
by a previous pilot, rendering the red out-
line ForeFlight uses to delineate Presiden-
tial TFRs virtually invisible.
His takeaway from the incident was not
that he should make a habit of pre-flight-
ing his mobile device. His takeaway was
that ForeFlight should update its software
to return opacity settings to a “default”
setting when the app is closed.
“Most GA pilots have started using
ForeFlight. It is used by a wide range
of corporate and government customers,
state and federal agencies. It is one of the
highest rated, widely used aviation pack-
ages,” he wrote.


Therefore, in his estimation, it is in-
cumbent upon ForeFlight to force each
pilot to re-adjust the multiple opacity set-
tings, to keep pilots safe.
As for ATC, the pilot concluded that
the incursion could have been avoided
because “Approach control could have
vectored us away from the TFR as soon
as I had hit the first ident.”
A transplanted Florida GA pilot filed a
NASA Report after an accidental viola-
tion near his new South Carolina home
base of Summerville Airport (KDYB).
“I flew my hour-long flight outside
Charleston’s airspace, only to find upon
landing that I had violated a Presidential
TFR,” he wrote.
He stated he had checked for NOTAMs
at the four airports along his route of
flight. None of the four mentioned a TFR.
On the one hand, he admitted he should
have called Flight Service before depart-
ing. On the other hand, he blamed the un-
manned FBO at his departure airport for
having its weather computer turned off,
making him unable to check that.
He blamed the state of South Carolina
for not publicly disclosing to newcomers
the existence of the small, unpopulated is-
land around which the Presidential TFR
was issued.
Also, he decided Charleston Interna-
tional Airport (KCHS) “could really ben-
efit from some more open disclosure of its
unique airspace issues.”
Last of all, he blamed his violation on
the fact that his local GA community was
small and “tough to get to know.”
He and the Cessna 414 driver both
seem to believe that their infractions were
not their fault. They weren’t alone.
Plenty of Presidential TFR NASAs
were written with that same attitude.
There’s a distinctive Spanish phrase that
describes that attitude: “Eche la culpa.”
Literally, it means to throw the blame on
somebody else.
A person who tends to eche la culpa is
someone who sees himself as a victim. In
aviation terms, victim mentality is simi-
lar to having a resignation attitude. That’s
one of aviation’s Notorious Five Hazard-
ous Attitudes.
And a pilot who displays the resigna-
tion attitude is a dangerous pilot even be-
fore stepping into the cockpit.
The antidote for resignation attitude in-
flight is to remember CFR 91.3: The PIC
is the final authority for aircraft operation.
A large percentage of Presidential TFR
violation NASA reports revealed another

dangerous pilot tendency: Complacency
bred from familiarity.
One Cessna 210 pilot launched from
his home base to practice maneuvers in
that airport’s practice area. He performed
stalls, lazy eights, and chandelles, as well
as slow flight. He ended the session with a
flight to the nearby VOR to practice holds.
“This was a local flight. I did not check
the NOTAMs,” he admitted.
So it was a huge surprise to him when
a fighter jet intercepted him en route to
the VOR. Per the fighter pilot’s instruc-
tions, and under escort, the Cessna pilot
returned to his home airfield and landed.
After final radio contact with the fighter
jet, he hangared his plane and attempted
to drive home.
“Driving away from the hangar on the
ramp area, noticed two cop vehicles be-
hind me and two in front; hence stopped,”
he wrote. “They informed me I busted a
Presidential TFR.”
They held him until Secret Service ar-
rived 90 minutes later. A one-hour inter-
view followed.
“Check NOTAMs even for local flights
to practice area!” emphasized the pilot in
his conclusion.
Another pilot filed a NASA after in-
advertently violating a Presidential
TFR over Orlando International Airport
(KMCO).
He wrote that, prior to his flight, “I did
not call flight services to check for TFRs
because I am on auto-distribution for
TFRs via my email address.”
He launched and overflew KMCO
Class B airspace for a total of 46 minutes
VFR, at 10,500’. He chose not to file a
VFR flight plan or use flight following
services due to his familiarity with the
route.
When he landed at Sebring Regional
Airport (KSEF), the airport manager in-
formed him of the Presidential TFR in
place and that he had violated that TFR.
“Mortified, I spoke with an FAA repre-
sentative and provided all requested in-
formation.”
He also explained that the normal email
TFR notification system had failed him,
as he’d received none. He further won-
dered why he hadn’t been notified or in-
tercepted while airborne.
The response was that the pilot’s slow,
steady, straight and level flight path over
the Class B airspace made two things
clear to ATC: That he did not represent a
threat and that he probably was unaware
of the Presidential TFR. But they didn’t
warn him, either.
The pilot investigated further. He and a
fellow pilot searched unsuccessfully for
the TFR online. Neither ever found that
specific TFR.
Despite lack of written evidence of that
TFR, the pilot concluded in his report, “I
am sickened that I made such an avoid-
able mistake, and it has been an absolute

wake-up call for me.”
This pilot failed himself by forgetting
to heed CFR 91.103: Each pilot shall be-
come familiar with all available informa-
tion concerning that flight.

Not Just Pilots
It isn’t just pilots who get complacent
and get caught. Controllers file Presiden-
tial TFR violation NASA Reports, too.
A Potomac Approach controller and
a Ronald Reagan Washington National
Airport (KDCA) Tower controller filed
NASAs after multiple Presidential TFR
infractions occurred on the same day.
“DCA Tower called with a three min-
ute to liftoff call off KADW (Joint Base
Andrews), which is seven miles southeast
of KDCA,” wrote the Potomac Approach
controller.
KADW is the home base for Air Force
One. Approach put 15 KDCA arrivals into
holds, anticipating Air Force One’s depar-
ture and transition through their airspace.
However, KDCA Tower continued to
clear aircraft for takeoff. At one point two
airliners departing Reagan National were
separated less than a mile from Air Force
One, and converging.
In his report, the Potomac Approach
controller asked, “How is it we on Ap-
proach are not allowed to run arrivals, yet
they have authority to release airplanes
right at presidential aircraft?”
The KDCA controller countered that
he had maintained basic separation and
that he had had eyes on Air Force One the
whole time.
The Potomac Approach controller wor-
ried that — regardless — such actions
were too risky. He concluded that a Work-
ing Group is needed to better coordinate
VIP movement among Potomac Ap-
proach, KDCA Tower and KADW Tower.

Learn the Locales
The C-210 pilot did not bother to check
NOTAMs because he was only flying out
to the neighborhood aerial practice area.
The Florida pilot thought his email
setup and his familiarity with the route of
flight were good enough.
And KDCA Tower controllers believed
that the airline traffic they controlled
posed no danger to the president.
We know that each U.S. president com-
municates early on in his administration
where he likes to travel domestically.
Let’s learn about those locales. Let’s stay
abreast of the president’s travel plans.
Let’s remember that NOTAMs aren’t
always printed and distributed in a timely
manner.
And, let’s not rely solely on digital
communication. Let’s pick up the mic or
actually use a phone to talk to ATC. They
do have the TFRs.
Just remember, there is no complacency
provision in 91.103, and there is no eche
la culpa in 91.3.

Eche la Culpa


Human Factors


Jeffrey Madison


Jeffrey Madison, a pilot since 1995, is an
ATP CFI/MEI. He has over 1,000 hours dual
given. He has flown into more than 250
GA airports throughout most of the Lower


  1. He is a former Part 121 and Part
    135 airline captain. You can reach him at
    [email protected]

Free download pdf