General Aviation News - 21 June 2018

June 21, 2018 http://www.GeneralAviationNews.com — Buyer’s Guide Marketplace — facebook.com/ganews 27

ASRS Reports

to get past the computer selection to talk
to a real person about this.

Aircraft: Baron 55

Primary Problem: Human Factors

Tower cleared me to “line up and wait,
traffic crossing runway, caution wake tur-
bulence” at which time I requested a two-
minute delay for wake turbulence. The
Controller repeated the lineup and wait
clearance, and added “delay at your dis-
cretion.” I waited two minutes, and then
began my takeoff roll. At about 2,000’
into the takeoff roll, I noticed an airliner
exiting the left side of the runway. I re-
duced power for two seconds. About the
time I reduced power the plane had ex-
ited the runway and I reapplied power and
lifted off. Upon reaching 200’ AGL, the
Tower called and told me I had not been
cleared for takeoff.
I continued on to my destination after
the Tower requested I call a number after
I reached my destination.
I must have been concentrating so much
about the wake turbulence of the 737 that
had taken off in front of me that I took
the phrase “delay at your discretion” as a
takeoff clearance when in fact one had not
been issued.
Other contributing factors: I had just
completed a two-day refresher course
in the Baron simulator, which had been
very rigorous and I must have been more
fatigued than I realized. That, combined
with anxiety over wake turbulence from
the busy airline traffic, caused me not to
concentrate on the clearance given, inter-
preting the phrase “at my discretion” as a
release clearance for takeoff. It might be
better phraseology to say, “Line up and
wait for takeoff clearance” to reinforce
the exact instruction given.
Light aircraft holding in position on
the runway with airliners waiting is not a
comfortable position. It might be safer for
the controller to hold the lighter aircraft
on the taxiway until they can issue a take-
off clearance instead of a line up and wait.
This would alleviate the potential of inad-
vertent takeoffs. Definitely a brain lapse.
For older pilots the new wording ver-
sus the old “Hold in Position” may have
some psychological disconnect versus
the more ingrained terminology used for
many years.

Aircraft: M-20 B/C Ranger

Primary Problem: Aircraft

Fuel tanks were topped off and the ap-
propriate preflight checklist was com-
pleted prior to flight, with an expected
endurance of approximately 4.5 hours.
At the time of run-up prior to flight, the
appropriate checklist was followed and

all systems appeared to be normal. Dur-

ing enroute flight all systems appeared to

be operating in a normal conditions. We

began a descent completing the appro-

priate checklist. We flew approximately

2.5 hours before a sudden loss of engine

power was experienced. Subsequently,

the appropriate emergency checklist was

completed and air traffic control was ad-

vised. A diversion was made to ZZZ air-

port, and a forced landing was successful-

ly executed at the airport with no damage

or injuries. Student and I exercised CRM

throughout the flight.

Later, water was found inside the car-

buretor and determined to be from carbu-

retor ice. The carburetor heat system was

also found to be malfunctioning.

Aircraft: Skyhawk 172

Primary Problem: Human Factors

About to launch on an IFR instrument

practice flight. Cleared to take off from an

intersection. Taxied on to the runway and

initiated the takeoff roll. I somehow con-

fused the runway edge lights with the cen-

ter light. Corrective action was initiated

too late and, as a result, I hit one runway

edge light with the left side wheel fairing.

Aborted the takeoff and notified the

tower. Exited the runway on Golf, in-

formed ground to remove debris from the

wheel fairing from the runway and taxied

back to the hangar.

A combination of the landing light on

the aircraft just died, I had not flown in the

Cessna for a number of months, nor had I

practiced IFR in a number of months were

the factors leading up to the event.

Aircraft: Bonanza 36

Primary Problem: Weather

I was enroute at 12,000’ IFR. The flight

was in visual conditions for the first ap-

proximately 3.5 hours. There was a bro-

ken line of scattered showers running

from southwest to northeast about 100 nm

from my destination. I checked the XM

weather in the plane for lightning associ-

ated with the system, and saw no strikes

from about 100 miles out. Approaching

the system I was given the usual arrival

change to my flight plan and was cleared

for deviations for weather by Center. I

discussed the path through the scattered

storms and determined that the control-

ler’s opinion of the best path around cells

was the same as my radar showed, which

I confirmed to him.

Approaching the cloud bank, I went

into IMC and encountered turbulence. I

was flying on instruments with the auto-

pilot set, when I heard a loud bang and

felt an impact on the left side of the plane

and saw that the wingtip tank had explod-

ed and a fragment was visible, wrapped

around the airstream and facing the cabin,

inside out. I determined that the airplane

was upright, but had lost altitude.

The controller called me to tell me my

altitude was low, which I knew, by about

400’ because of the turbulence and dam-

age. I did not want to make abrupt alti-

tude or heading changes due to concerns

about controllability and possible further

damage to the airframe in the turbulence.

I informed the controller that I had suf-

fered an apparent lightning strike and that

the left tip tank had exploded. I confirmed

that the plane was producing good power

and had plenty of fuel in the other tanks,

and that the tank that was damaged had

already been used and was empty except

for residual fuel.

In further radio calls I confirmed that

the airplane was “aerodynamically a little

weird” but otherwise controllable. The

drag from the left side was causing the

ship to fly in a slight right bank, which I

later found could be corrected with right

rudder, and had lost about 20 kts of air-

speed.

During these subsequent conversations

the controller confirmed the state of emer-

gency and asked for fuel (2.5 hrs.) and

SOB. He offered landing at a nearby un-

towered airport and I declined due to my

desire to remain in as steady a flight con-

dition as possible until I felt confident the

plane was safe, plus I did not want to be

looking for an unfamiliar airport in IMC

with a damaged aircraft. We agreed that

I would be behind the storm system and

most likely in clear air in 15 minutes or

so. I did request and received a lower alti-

tude because the OAT was just at zero and

I was in a cloud.

I received further vectors when the

flight was handed off to TRACON, re-

sulting in an almost straight flight path

to the airport once another storm system

had passed that airport. One controller

advised me that another airport had gone

VFR and was near my location. By that

time I was confident that the plane had no

structural damage and was quite control-

lable. I told the controller that I was sure

I could not “undeclare” an emergency but

that I no longer felt that the plane was in

jeopardy and just wanted to get it to its

home base where it could be repaired by

my usual maintenance shop, which had

originally installed the tip tanks and knew

that system.

I arrived at my destination and dis-

cussed the issue with the firefighters

who had rolled to the ramp in wait, and

turned the plane so that the tower control-

ler could see the damage. After confirm-

ing that I was safe and in good health, the

firefighters left and I received a clearance

to taxi to my hangar.

I’m not sure if I know how this could be

avoided in the future. I have approached

and flown through many weather sce-

narios that were like this or worse with

nothing more than a rough ride and a wet

airplane. I think I should have checked

for lightning again when I was closer,

although the bolt that hit me might well

have been the only one there was. I am

researching adding static wicks to the air-

plane to see if these will reduce the likeli-

hood of the airframe attracting lightning,

and if I determine that they are effective I

intend to install them.

Aircraft: M-20 K (231)/Encore

Primary Problem: Human Factors

My medical expired mid-year 2016. I

received my BasicMed certificate in late

2017. I flew during this time without a
      valid medical because I waited to see the
      details for flying under BasicMed.

Aircraft: GA aircraft

Primary Problem: Procedure

I was conducting IFR training with a

student at the Cleburne, Texas, airport

(CPT). We were cleared for the RNAV

Runway 15 approach, and upon breaking

out of the overcast layer at 700’ AGL on

descent, we noticed there was a very large

construction crane approximately 1/2

mile east/southeast of the airport.

I had done an extensive briefing for this

flight with my student and had not noted

any obstruction NOTAMs for this airport.

This construction crane rises to approxi-

mately 1,000 AGL. It is located due east,

nearly abeam the numbers of Runway 33

at approximately 1/2 mile from the field.

The only signal I noted on the crane was a

difficult-to-see red and white flag.

As this was a training flight, we had

received alternate climb out instructions

from the Approach Controller at my re-

quest. The climb out instructions were

to enter controlled airspace heading 090

and to maintain 3,000. Because the first

700 AGL of this area is Class G airspace,

we continued on runway heading until we

could verify we would clear the crane be-

fore turning out to the east.

I tried calling the FAA Obstruction

Evaluation/Airport Airspace Analysis

(OE/AAA) office, but with no response

there I called the airport, They informed

me there should have been an active NO-

TAM for that crane. They said they had no

ability to put out an obstruction NOTAM

themselves, since these are handled by the

OE/AAA office.

I would recommend a future enhance-

ment to the NOTAM system which per-

mits pilots and airport managers to report

these issues in a more timely fashion.